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Preface
Historically, in many countries, most charitable foundations have been 
reactive, responding to applications made by a range of organisations, 
large and small. However, there have been and currently are exceptions 
to this way of working. Some foundations seek to operate in a diff erent 
way, more strategically and proactively. Th ey seek to understand 
particular markets for social, environmental and cultural goods and 
identify needs, gaps in provision, the potential for collaboration 
and opportunities to build on next practice and support innovation. 
Foundations with this mindset can potentially act as a positively 
disruptive force; they can intervene to make and shift  markets so that 
they are more responsive to the needs of the vulnerable. One of the 
ways in which they can do this is by taking the initiative – based on 
their knowledge of what is needed and what might work – to establish 
a new social purpose organisation.
Many foundations support new organisations, nothing new or worthy 
of enquiry there. What we are concerned with here is diff erent; it is 
‘where a foundation has been involved in the conception and creation 
of something new which the foundation also backs fi nancially and 
supports in other ways’. Although there are numerous examples 
of foundation initiated and supported organisations, there is little 
discussion of this aspect of their work. Acknowledging this, the Barrow 
Cadbury Trust, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (UK Branch) and the 
Paul Hamlyn Foundation came together to steer and support this study 
with the intention of sharing and refl ecting on their practice drawing 
on learning from other European foundations. (Notably, the report 
includes a good geographical spread of European case studies).
Where a foundation not only acts as midwife but as parent too it 
creates a new and diff erent relationship and bond with the organisation 
and presents a range of new challenges and dilemmas. Th ese are 
intelligently and elegantly explored by Diana Leat in this publication 
with the aim of promoting greater awareness, knowledge and a pan-
European conversation. 
3Some foundations appear reticent about this aspect of their practice 
perhaps primarily because of anxiety about legitimacy and fear of 
criticism/hostility from existing organisations operating in the fi eld. 
However, the creation of a new organisation is one potential tool 
in a foundation’s tool-box and may, in particular circumstances, 
be the best way of intervening given the resources available. Key 
questions are:
  does the foundation have legitimacy, a mandate and adequate 
resources – both tangible and in terms of networks – to create 
the change;
 does it have suffi  cient knowledge of the fi eld;
 do experts support the need for intervention;
  can it make a robust case for the organisation/will it be able 
to garner suffi  cient support for its work; and 
  can it live with the consequences for other, existing, 
organisations in that fi eld?
Starting a new organisation presents a number of risks for foundations. 
For example, they may fear taking responsibility for failure (as 
compared with conventional grant-making where ‘failure’ tends to 
rest with the applicant organisation/grantee rather than with the 
foundation). However, that does not mean it is a tactic that should 
be avoided but, rather, one to be adopted intelligently and with eyes 
wide open. Not least because foundations, as Diana indicates, are 
oft en well-equipped ‘to act as institutional entrepreneurs’, because of 
their ‘prior knowledge of a fi eld, creativity, optimism and developed 
social networks’,  because they ‘may have the perception and incentive 
to create and champion new practices’ and because they ‘have the 
resources to, at least, instigate change.’
Andrew Barnett
(Director, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation – UK Branch)
Rob Bell
(Head of Social Justice, Paul Hamlyn Foundation) 
Sara Llewellin
(Chief Executive, Barrow Cadbury Trust)
Preface
4 The Inventive Foundation: creating new ventures in Europe
Th is study would not have been possible without the generosity 
and inventiveness of the funders: Barrow Cadbury Trust, 
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation UK and Paul Hamlyn 
Foundation. It would also not have been possible without the 
help of the Advisory Group: Mall Hallam, Lenia Vlavianou, 
Rosien Herweijer and Bettina Windau.
In the course of this research I met and talked with around 80 
people so I cannot list them all. But I am nevertheless truly grateful 
for the time they gave me, for their welcome, for their hospitality, 
and for their willingness to speak English. My special thanks go 
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Th is study explores the work of the entrepreneurial 
or inventive foundation involved in the conception 
and creation of something new which the foundation 
also backs fi nancially and supports in other ways. 
Th e study is not representative of the variety of 
foundations’ entrepreneurial behaviour. Cases were 
selected to include larger and smaller foundations, 
across diff erent European contexts. Th e study was 
funded by Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation UK,
Barrow Cadbury Trust and the Paul Hamlyn Foundation.
  Th e most general conclusion is that foundations are well 
positioned to be institutional entrepreneurs. Th ey have 
knowledge, broad networks and resources. Th ey are not 
so ‘embedded’ that they cannot imagine new ideas, but are 
suffi  ciently embedded to acquire resources and open doors to 
put new ideas into practice. But there are also challenges for the 
foundation wanting to act as an institutional entrepreneur:
  Foundations are generally afraid of appearing arrogant and 
interfering. Th eir preference is to avoid duplication and 
competition; only when no existing organisation is meeting, 
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9  Creating a new organisation requires careful thought and 
study, but considering what is needed – versus what is on off er 
– could be instructive both in identifying needs/gaps and in 
assessing other applications. 
  Fear of ‘ending up with the bill forever’ is a signifi cant reason 
for not creating something new. Sustainability of the new 
organisation and foundation exit are high on the agenda from 
the start.
  Once a need is established foundations have a choice between 
starting a new programme within the foundation and creating 
a new organisation. Foundations give 4 main reasons for creating 
an independent organisation (rather than a new programme):
 1.   Longevity – the hope is that the new organisation will 
attract other funders 
 2.   Independence, legitimacy and reputation – hoping that 
the organisation will have its own independent reputation/
legitimacy 
 3.   Avoiding longer term commitment from the foundation; 
and/or the appearance of additional operational costs 
 4.   Political considerations – the foundation is not seen to 
be imposing its agenda. A fi ft h reason, rarely mentioned, 
is that creating a new organisation enables the foundation 
to create new knowledge to learn from and to share 
  Overcoming the liabilities of newness is challenging. Internally 
trustees have to back something unknown, untried, non-
existent. Th e new venture suff ers from the same problem 
externally. One way of overcoming these problems is to 
create and test a model within the foundation itself or some 
other established organisation. Hosting (providing back-
offi  ce services) is another approach. With some exceptions, 
foundations avoid naming the new venture aft er themselves.
  Early involvement of partners is seen as encouraging wider 
‘ownership’ of the organisation and reducing the danger of 
Key Findings
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it being seen as ‘X foundation’s baby’. But involving partners 
also has costs in terms of loss of control and oft en a slower 
timetable.
  Foundations stress the need for budget fl exibility and 
adaptability. In grant-making the grantee typically lives with the 
consequences – and costs – of both unforeseen circumstances 
and of change; when the foundation acts as an institutional 
entrepreneur the foundation more obviously and directly has 
to deal with the complications of turning plans into reality.
  Time and patience are other major challenges. Th is sounds 
obvious but in many ways grant-making enables foundations to 
set their own terms of commitment. Foundations that engage 
in ‘DIY’ do not have the luxury of hypothetical timetables.
  Finding the right staff  and board members is crucial to the likely 
success of the new organisation. Th is is oft en more diffi  cult than 
anticipated, especially where something is truly innovative in 
re-combining skills and concepts and/or where the substantive 
skills to do the work are not combined with the managerial 
skills to sustain the fl edgling organisation. Whether to take a 
seat on the Board is generally a dilemma for the foundation. 
  Building sound infrastructure for the new organisation is 
emphasised but again requires investment now for results that 
are not immediately apparent.
  New organisations need a strong communications strategy 
and capacity but foundations may struggle with the high 
profi le a new organisation needs, may not wish to help for 
fear of appearing to ‘own’ the new organisation, or may fear 
encouraging dependence in the longer-run.
  Foundation exit is generally planned and built in from the start 
but foundations admit that, in reality, the precise timing and 
nature of exit can be negotiable: new organisations are like 
children with their own ages and stages. Set cut-off  dates are 
for books, not real life.
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Background 
Th is study arose from discussions between a small number of 
foundations involved in the process of creating new organisations 
who wanted to share experiences with and from other foundations 
across Europe. Th e aim of the study was to encourage discussion 
and learning around the roles of foundations in generating new, 
and where appropriate, sustainable organisations. Th e study was 
designed not as ‘a guide to start-ups’ but rather as a collection of 
stories exploring why this path (ie generating a new organisation) 
was taken, the dilemmas, challenges, roles, relationships, costs and 
benefi ts, and what worked and what might have worked better. 
Note on the Study and the Presentation 
of Cases
In the course of this study it became increasingly clear that it is 
rare that there is only one claim to parenthood. Creating social 
institutions that survive is generally an eff ort that requires more 
than one actor. As the old saying goes: ‘Success has many parents. 
Failure is an orphan’.
In focusing on the roles of foundations in the creation of new 
organisations the implication is not that the foundation did this 
alone as single hero or heroine but rather that (with others) the 
foundation played a signifi cant role that included much more than 
money.
Because of the complexity of organisational creation, and for other 
reasons including space, the inclusion of names of individuals has 
been avoided. In some cases individuals were hugely important 
but these also tended to be cases where roles are complex and 
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
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contested. Another reason why names have been avoided is that 
in a minority of cases understanding the roles of individuals 
would require a glossary, biography and history section as long, 
if not longer, than the case itself. Yet another reason for avoiding 
individual names is that individuals oft en wear more than one hat 
and play diff erent roles depending on the organisation they speak 
for at any given moment.
Foundations Don’t Create Organisations 
Do Th ey?
In recent decades the dominant assumption among foundations 
has been that foundations make grants or operate their own 
programmes. Grant-making foundations have favoured supporting 
existing organisations – whether responding to the pattern of grant 
applications or proactively deciding on a goal and then fi nding 
existing organisations to carry it out. 
Grant-making foundations are oft en keen to stress that they ‘don’t 
play God’, they do not impose their values and goals on society, 
and they don’t compete with or add to competition among existing 
voluntary organisations. Grant-making to existing organisations 
has the eff ect of not only allowing foundations to appear reactive/ 
‘democratic’ but also of enabling foundations to avoid long term 
responsibility for an organisation: the foundation is not mother, 
father or midwife but merely plays the role of a kindly, rich aunt 
or uncle who helps out when needed.
Th is approach to the roles of foundations has at least two major 
fl aws. One is that it restricts the foundation to doing only what 
existing organisations are already doing or are prepared to do; that 
may be fi ne in a diverse, developed non-profi t market perfectly 
related to need (if any such exists) but it may be overly restrictive 
in less developed non-profi t environments, or those which do not 
adequately refl ect needs and/or new thinking, or are overly satisfi ed 
or overly competitive (something to which highly developed 
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institutionalised non-profi t sectors may be prone).
Th e second problem with the notion that foundations work only 
through existing organisations is that it is not true. Th e history of 
foundations clearly shows that for at least 100 years foundations 
have on occasion chosen to create new organisations in order to 
achieve their goals. At various times, Rockefeller, Carnegie and 
Ford, for example, all created new organisations of varying size 
and degrees of independence. In some cases, the new organisation 
was clearly and deliberately separate from the foundation; in other 
cases the new organisation acted for a longer or shorter period as a 
programme of the foundation.
In the past it seems that many foundations were very happy to 
admit to, even trumpet, their creations; today things are not so 
clear. Partly because of the way in which foundations are required 
to report their activities and partly because of organisational 
reticence in admitting to organisational creation, today it is 
diffi  cult to see how widespread the practice of creating new 
organisations actually is, what forms it takes, and the nature of the 
challenges and obstacles. (Th ere are interesting questions about 
when and why foundations became less comfortable with creating 
new organisations – have foundations been ‘captured’ by potential 
grantees? Have they become overly focussed on grant-making?). 
Th is study seeks to look more closely at this now neglected aspect 
of foundation practice, bringing it out of the ‘shadows’ into 
daylight.
Generating New Organisations: Exploring 
the Territory
Although it is possible to fi nd examples of foundation generated 
organisations, there is little explicit discussion of this type of 
activity. Attention to foundations’ activities as entrepreneurs have 
been crowded out in recent years by ‘venture philanthropy’. Ever 
since an article by Letts, Ryan and Grossman (1997) discussion 
of venture philanthropy has been fashionable but venture 
Chapter 1  Introduction
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philanthropy is somewhat diff erent from the phenomenon we 
are interested in here. Venture philanthropists back very new 
organisations or ideas started by entrepreneurs. Th e social 
entrepreneur and the venture philanthropist roles have tended 
to be muddled but, as in business, the venture capitalist/
philanthropist and the entrepreneur undertake diff erent roles and 
activities, and face diff erent challenges.
Parallels with Venture Philanthropy
Th e European Venture Philanthropy Association (EVPA)
describes venture philanthropy as ‘most appropriate as a source 
of fi nance and support to SPOs that are seeking a ‘step change’ in 
their operations’ (2008). In other words, venture philanthropy is 
concerned with supporting existing organisations, whereas the 
focus in this report is on foundations creating organisations that do 
NOT already exist. While there may be some similarities in tasks 
and process – for example, getting the right management team and 
Board, putting sound fi nancial processes in place etc – the starting 
point is very diff erent. 
Th e relationships too may be diff erent; for example, EVPA notes 
that ‘VPO’s need to be very conscious of the perception that they 
are trying to impose their own agenda’ – but for the foundation 
creating a new organisation there is a sense in which the 
foundation is doing just that: creating its own agenda (although, 
as discussed below, some would question this). 
Parallels with Direct Charitable Activities (DCAs) 
Direct Charitable Activities (DCAs) or ‘Funder plus’ activities are 
other widely discussed approaches relevant to this study. It may 
be useful to see generating new organisations as one, arguably in 
some respects extreme, strategy within the broader group of DCA 
or ‘funder plus’ activities. A Foundation Center study of DCAs 
(2007) provides some interesting general observations that may 
be relevant to the process of generating a new organisation.
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Th e study suggests that private foundations may choose to engage 
in DCAs because they have identifi ed an important need they wish 
to address, and, in conducting research, fi nd that there is no non-
profi t currently addressing the issue; in other cases, the foundation 
may see itself as in the best position to innovate and implement 
an idea directly. Reasons given for direct action include a belief 
that the foundation can run a programme more cost-eff ectively 
than a professional charity, with a minimum of overhead, thereby 
maximizing the impact of its funding. One other fi nding is worth 
noting: although DCAs exist as an opportunity for all private 
foundations, historically larger, fully staff ed foundations have been 
most likely to carry them out. 
Th e closest study relevant to our own is Grantcraft ’s guide 
to working with start-ups (undated). Th is guide is full of 
interesting material but it is more general than this study in that 
it covers organisations generated by foundations as well as new 
organisations generated elsewhere but supported by foundations. 
Th e Grantcraft  guide contains a fascinating interview in which 
the commentator suggests that start-ups generated by others and 
those generated by funders have diff erent fi nancial profi les and 
need diff erent things. Foundation generated start-ups are described 
as ‘start-ups on steroids’, ‘they start all bulked up. Th ey tend to 
be more fi nancially mature right out of the gate, except in the 
area of fundraising. Th ey haven’t had to go through the hoops of 
getting people to invest in them’ (26). Th e interviewee continues: 
‘I don’t believe in strategic plans in the start-up years. Strategic 
planning is about focus, and the last thing you want to do is focus 
a start-up. People buy into a plan, board members in particular. 
People who like routine like plans, but start-ups need something 
diff erent. Start-ups need entrepreneurs who can think big and take 
advantage of opportunities.’ ‘Ideally, a funder will let a start-up be 
a start-up. Let them make mistakes. Let them kind of stumble a 
little bit, because the fall isn’t so great if they stumble, and they’re 
learning as they go’.
Chapter 1  Introduction
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Parallels with the Enterprise and Social 
Enterprise Literature
In exploring the questions above we found the enterprise research 
literature most helpful in providing some interesting observations 
and frameworks for considering what goes on when foundations 
generate new organisations. Although much discussion tends 
to see social entrepreneurship as about a process of generating 
economically sustainable organisations, the term may be used 
more broadly to include the process of modifying institutional 
structures or creating new ones.
Previous research on social enterprise formation suggests that 
there are four broad stages: (I) opportunity recognition and 
development/ intention formation (ii) start-up (iii) growth (iv) 
consolidation (and here we might add ‘exit‘).
According to social enterprise theory, the process begins 
with recognition of an opportunity/need. Th is happens when 
entrepreneurial alertness exceeds a certain level – this in turn 
depends on creativity and optimism, relevant prior knowledge and 
experience and good social networks. Opportunity may be seen 
where there are gaps in the market/provision and/or where there 
are resources and capabilities that could be (additionally) employed 
for new purposes. Th e literature also stresses the importance of 
prior knowledge of markets, prior knowledge of ways to serve 
markets and prior knowledge of customer problems. Arguably, 
prior knowledge of a fi eld, creativity, optimism and developed 
social networks are all characteristics of foundations. If this 
is true then foundations are, in theory, well equipped to act as 
institutional entrepreneurs.
Th ere is a debate as to whether opportunity recognition comes 
from ‘accidental discovery’ or systematic search. Some argue that 
‘accidental’ discovery of opportunities is most likely when the 
entrepreneur is in ‘passive search’ – receptive though not engaged 
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in formal search. Again it could be argued that active foundations 
are always in passive search.
Social networks are important to opportunity recognition. 
Social entrepreneurs tend to have large numbers of ‘weak’ ties 
(or acquaintances) acting as bridges to information sources not 
included in strong tie networks – arguably another characteristic 
of active foundations. 
Another observation from the social enterprise literature is that 
there are signifi cant commonalities between independent start-ups 
and internal corporate ventures. Th is may suggest that there are 
similarities in foundations between the processes of starting a new 
organisation and a new programme.
One of the big puzzles in the social enterprise literature is what 
is known as the ‘paradox of embedded agency’. Th is refers to the 
fact that dominant, established actors in a given fi eld may have 
the power to force change but oft en lack the perception and 
motivation; while peripheral players may have the perception and 
incentive to create and champion new practices, they oft en lack 
the power and resources to eff ect change. Foundations, it could be 
argued, oft en combine the best of both worlds. Th ey are ‘peripheral 
players’ (in the sense that they have a foot in many camps but a tent 
in none) but also have the resources to, at least, instigate change. 
Th ere is one other observation from the social enterprise literature 
that may be worth considering in relation to foundations 
generating new organisations: a critical mass of established fi rms 
can be a barrier to new entrants such that entrepreneurs are likely 
to play a more prominent role in markets not already occupied by 
large fi rms. In the foundation case does this mean that foundations 
are less likely to start new organisations where there are well-
established voluntary organisations?
Chapter 1  Introduction
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Th e social enterprise literature has less to say about the other three 
stages – perhaps because it seems to be accepted that these are 
more individual and idiosyncratic.
If we look at the typical entrepreneurial process in terms of roles 
then these might be: envisioning, engaging, enabling and enacting 
(Sykes 2002). What is interesting here is that because foundations 
have the capacity to act as both entrepreneurs and venture funders 
then maybe they do not need to ‘engage’ (others) and ‘enable’ 
(deals) ie because they can do it themselves; alternatively it could 
be argued that engaging and enabling are equally important but in 
diff erent ways and for diff erent reasons (e.g to establish legitimacy 
of a new venture or to ensure engagement of other funders for 
sustainability).
First Th oughts from the Field
Before embarking on the case studies we undertook a series 
of exploratory interviews with a range of foundations. Th ese 
interviews were designed not only to identify cases for possible 
inclusion in the study, but also to explore broader views on 
whether foundations should be involved in generating new 
organisations, when and why this happens and the potential 
challenges and benefi ts.
Roles and Purposes
As several people noted, start-ups are a means not an end. And one 
person added ‘the ends may be various, emergent and messy’.
Another said: ‘Being a grant maker is not a description of an 
outcome oriented organisation – grant-making is about outputs. 
If you want to get to real change then you need other tools in your 
box. Starting a new organisation is one.’
‘Once you really know a fi eld, there’s a good chance that if you are 




One reason for wariness about creating a new organisation is that 
it may be seen as a criticism of existing players. Another reason 
is a fear of being seen to be responsible for a new ‘baby’ for years 
to come. From the new orgaisation’s perspective there may also 
be wariness about being seen to be a foundation’s creation: will 
that make the new organisation less ‘authentic’, and will it create 
problems in obtaining funding from other funders?
‘Double talk’
One person noted that foundations may be reluctant to publicise 
their involvement in a new creation but, at the same time, ‘the 
foundation tacitly requires that the grantee must never forget their 
roots’. Another noted that ‘foundations want to be remembered for 
the future credit but not necessarily for the future funding’.
Types
Interviewees provided a range of examples but also drew 
distinctions between diff erent types of start-ups generated by 
foundations. At least 5 types were identifi ed: 
 Foundation led creation of a new and separate organisation
 A (new) foundation programme/foundation as actor
 Seed funding for an organisation that does not yet exist
  Foundation funding for a new programme/project within an 
existing organisation with a view to later separation
 Rejuvenation – encouraging an organisation to reinvent itself
One variable here seems to be degree of foundation control – or 
perhaps it is more to do with foundation responsibility? Th inking 
about types also raises the issue of timing; for example, what starts 
as a foundation programme may later become a stand-alone new 
organisation.
Chapter 1  Introduction
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Barriers and Challenges
Th e following were cited as potential challenges and barriers to 
foundations creating new organisations:
 Not wanting to be seen to take the lead or stick your neck out 
 Opposition from existing organisations
 Th e amount of work involved
 Risk of failure
  No applicant/grantee track record – nothing on which to make 
a decision regarding support (mentioned as a potential barrier 
for staff  and especially trustees)
 Th e length of time before results will be apparent
Dangers
One person noted the dangers of a start-up as a form of ‘vanity 
publishing’: ‘Suppose a philanthropist or a foundation says we 
need x organisation. Th ey don’t do the research and create an 
organisation for which there is little need – that’s the equivalent of 
vanity publishing. Th at’s why here in this foundation we must see 
other people coming to the party. We start with a few foundations 
who recognise the problem, so we immediately move away from 
vanity, and then aft er some scoping we quickly try to bring in 
people who are experts’.
Ongoing Responsibility
Foundations interviewed at this early stage of the study were 
conscious of the potentially diff erent relationships and feelings of 
ongoing responsibility with organisations they had started. But not 
everyone felt that an organisation created by a foundation should 
have special consideration: ‘Th ere may be some trying to make 
sure the baby gets a chance to become an adult – but in other ways 
I’m happy to be as tough on as any other (grantee)‘.
‘I believe an organisation needs to grow up and stand on its own 
feet – but it’s the same really as any fl edgling organisation needing 
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time and so on to grow’.
Other Issues
Th ere is another challenge little mentioned in the early interviews: 
spotting the need or the opportunity. Th is is much discussed in 
the business start-up literature and is a theme worth pursuing in 
relation to foundations. 
Key Questions
It was not possible in a study of this size comprehensively to map 
the scale and scope of foundation involvement in generating new 
organisations. Instead we wanted to explore why foundations 
decide to create new organisations, the processes and the issues 
arising in a range of diff erent settings across Europe. We wanted 
to include countries with diff erently developed non-profi t sectors, 
and we wanted to select cases in diff erent fi elds of activity, and 
generating organisations of diff erent types. And we wanted to 
present the fi ndings of the study as a collection of stories on which 
readers may make their own judgements.
Why?
One major question we wanted to address was when and why 
foundations are likely to become involved in creating a new 
organisation. Is it because:
 no existing organisation is doing x
  no existing organisation appears to have the desire and/or the 
capacity to do x
  there are too many organisations doing bits of x – but not 
talking to each other enough and/or missing the gaps 
 a fresh, neutral start is seen as needed 
 or are there other reasons?
Chapter 1  Introduction
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Th e fi rst two reasons may be particularly important in certain 
‘industries’ and in certain parts of Europe. In some countries, 
at some times, starting a new organisation may be seen as a 
highly controversial choice and a damaging comment on existing 
organisations; in other countries there may be no choice but to 
create a new organisation. However, it might also be argued that 
a well-established voluntary sector does not obviate the need for 
new organisations – if existing organisations have become too set 
in their ways to address new challenges and ways of doing things or 
have become overly occupied with competing among themselves.
Another key question is how a foundation recognises and 
constructs the gap/need for a new organisation. As noted above, 
this is a key theme in the business literature and one we were keen 
to explore given the way in which it touches on foundations’ wider 
roles as ‘fi eld scanners/surveyors’ and policy entrepreneurs.
Starting Points?
We also wanted to explore the starting point, the environment 
and the sequence of events. Here there may be some important 
distinctions: 
 foundations acting alone
 a group of foundations acting together
  foundations working with/through an existing organisation 
to create a new separate project
Th e starting point and sequence of events raises the tricky issue 
of the division between a project of the foundation and a new 
separate organisation. It is possible that some new organisations 
start as a foundation project, or under the wing of an established 
organisation. and only later become legally separate (although not 
necessarily fi nancially independent). Starting points raise another 
diffi  cult issue: when a foundation ‘rescues’ an ailing organisation 




We were also interested in exploring the roles played by the 
foundation, what prompted/led to adoption of those roles, what 
considerations were involved, and the dilemmas and challenges, 
the costs and benefi ts of adoption of each role.
Processes and Steps
Th en we wanted to look at the processes and steps involved at each 
stage, as well as the other key players and their roles.
Challenges and Issues
We were interested in the challenges and issues in practice, 
including, for example, anxieties about legitimacy and power, 
criticism/hostility from existing organisations, anxieties about 
sustainability, ongoing responsibility and exit, anxieties about the 
practical challenges and costs of starting a brand new organisation, 
fear of responsibility for failure (as compared with conventional 
grant-making where ‘failure’ tends to rest with the applicant 
organisation/grantee rather than with the foundation).
Management and Governance
Finally, we were interested in identifying the roles played by 
foundations in both the management and the governance of the 
new organisation, and what were the dilemmas and considerations 
in making these decisions. We wanted to know how issues of 
independence and sustainability were dealt with; and what lessons 
the foundations learned and what advice they would give to others
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Bertelsmann Foundation and 
Phineo (Germany)
Th e Parent – Bertelsmann Foundation
Bertelsmann Foundation is an operating foundation founded in 
1977 by Reinhard Mohn. Its income is derived from shares in 
Bertelsmann SE&Co.KGaA. Based in Gutersloh it also has offi  ces in 
Washington and Brussels. Th e Foundation’s mission is to serve the 
common good ‘based on the conviction that competition and civic 
engagement are essential for social progress’ (www.Bertelsmann.
de). It describes itself as a think tank and catalyst for change. Th e 
foundation spends around 60 million Euros per annum under two 
main headings: Helping People and Strengthening Society.
Th e Off spring – Phineo
Phineo became independent in 2011. Its mission is to support 
civic engagement for the purpose of common welfare. Th is is 
done by making recommendations to social investors including 
philanthropists, foundations, and businesses, about non-profi t 
organisations and projects to suit their philanthropic plans. Phineo 
works with a specially developed quality assessment process and 
when it fi nds an organisation/approach that it rates as particularly 
promising it awards a ‘Phineo impact label’. Based on this work, 
over the last three years Phineo has expanded its activities to 
include formats for capacity building for non-profi t organisations 
and a strategic consultancy service. Phineo describes itself as 
a bridge linking those with money to non-profi t organisations 
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Spotting the Need
In the 1990s one of the discussions at Bertelsmann Foundation 
(BF) concerned ways in which potential philanthropic donors 
could be motivated to give more and more frequently. In theory 
the fi eld was ripe for more giving; people in Germany who had 
made money aft er the war were now in their sixties and were 
beginning to think about charitable giving; at the same time, there 
was a growth in discussion of corporate social responsibility in the 
business world. 
BF was already being approached by potential donors asking 
how to go about giving. With a good lawyer and accountant 
the legal and fi nancial arrangements were relatively simple. Th e 
problem was that potential donors had no means of identifying 
options for giving and knowing which organisations they could 
trust. BF became more and more conscious of this issue through 
consultations with new donors and through its own surveys of the 
potential for giving in Germany.
At around this time one senior member of staff  started looking 
at impact/evaluation training courses. Aft er taking a course in 
evaluation, she realised that such studies were within the reach of 
larger foundations but smaller foundations and new donors were 
unlikely to be able or willing to commit the resources necessary 
to assessing organisations and their activities. ‘Th ere was a gap – 
donors needed a way of evaluating charities and charities needed 
a way of showing their value’. Th e breakthrough for BF came when 
the staff  member attended a conference at which New Philanthropy 
Capital (NPC) gave a presentation. NPC had been created in 
London in 2002 to fi ll exactly the sort of gap BF had identifi ed. 




Th e fi rst thought was that the new organisation should be a project 
within BF but some staff  feared that the project would run for 5 
or 10 years and then end. Staff  wanted the new organisation to 
be more permanent, and, importantly, they wanted more people 
and organisations to be involved in its operation – it should not 
be simply a ‘Bertelsmann Foundation project’. Th e down side of 
creating a new organisation was obviously that it would take longer 
and require more work. On the other hand, BF had done this sort 
of thing before; ‘it’s in our DNA to do it like that. Our founder was 
an entrepreneur who understands that to build companies that fi t 
the environment they need to be very autonomous’. 
More generally, staff  at BF believed that foundations should 
consider the option of creating a new organisation more oft en. 
‘If you are from a grant-making background then it may be hard to 
go into such an adventure, it may feel more complicated and risky 
even if it isn’t really. Because we were an operating foundation that 
didn’t apply. But you do need to look very carefully at the resources 
you have to do it.’
From very early on it was clear that the new organisation – now 
christened Phineo – would be incubated within BF but would be 
separated from the Foundation and made fully independent as 
soon as possible.
Developing a Model and Incubating the 
New Organisation
NPC was the basic model but it needed to be adapted to the 
German context. Th e basic requirements were that the new 
organisation should be long lasting, open to other players in order 
to ensure legitimacy and long term fi nancial security, and should 
very clearly not be seen as a BF project.
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For three years BF tested and refi ned the basic NPC model. Some 
staff  working on the project were members of the BF team and 
others were recruited especially to work on the incubation of 
Phineo.
BF wanted Phineo to have a strong evaluation strand and it also 
spent some time enhancing and adapting the IT elements. In 
addition, BF tested the market – did people want what Phineo 
had to off er, would they use it and how could Phineo best serve 
their needs. While parts of the non-profi t sector were supportive 
of the basic idea many were anxious that impact analysis and 
transparency might be dangerous. Some of the larger charities were 
concerned that if other organisations were given a higher profi le 
funds might be diverted. Impact analysis could mean losers as well 
as winners. 
One of the major tasks in this period was to involve new partners 
both in funding Phineo and on the Board. Th is was described 
as ‘very very hard work’. Th e idea was new and untried and, in 
addition, the very notion of impact analysis was not accepted 
by all. ’We were touching a taboo in Germany – you don’t ask if 
charities actually do good – so we needed a wide group of partners’.
But recruiting a wide group of external partners depended on 
internal support and resources: ‘It’s such a big investment, it takes 
so long and there are so many risks so you must have Board and 
staff  champions – and a team to make it happen and who are 
knowledgeable enough to be convincing to other partners’. Some 
potential partners questioned why BF did not want to fully fund 
Phineo and run it alone. Yet another complication was that BF 
thought it important that Phineo have some roots in the for-profi t 
sector with organisations such as KPMG, banks etc ‘so that was a 
further complication because here if x is your partner then y won’t 
be’; and some foundations were reluctant to fund because they did 
not want to ‘subsidise Bertelsmann’. 
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Getting partners involved took time. Th e BF Board had said that 
they would only commit 50% of the money for Phineo when other 
partners had been recruited. ‘Th at made it hard because we had no 
independent organisation to point to. Th e work we had done here 
(at BF) was very very helpful because we could say ‘Look at NPC 
and look at the plans and analysis we have developed here’ – that’s 
where the incubator role is so useful’. ‘If I hadn’t had the work done 
at BF it wouldn’t have worked – that’s certain’.
Th e partners fi nally recruited for the fi rst phase were a small 
proportion of the 100 or more approached. ‘We got them 
because of the work we had done and because we came out of 
the Bertelsmann Foundation. Th at meant I had access to CEOs – 
no-one lower would have had the guts to take that risk. When we 
talked to people lower down we didn’t get the money.’
But fi nding the right balance in the relationship between Phineo 
and Bertelsmann remains a tricky issue. ‘I worry about the child 
being tainted by his parents. Success comes from having a broad 
group of strong partners – not just BF. So we use the BF name more 
or less – it gets you in some places but it’s dangerous in others’.
Independence
Aft er 3 years the model had been refi ned, the other partners were 
in place, a new legal structure was created and Phineo was ready 
to leave home. New offi  ces were found in Berlin and a team of 13 
people who had worked on the project in its incubation at BF were 
formally transferred to the now independent Phineo. ‘It was a bit 
of brain drain but there weren’t any issues. It was fi ne and many 
wanted to come and be part of something innovative’.
When the idea of Phineo was fi rst conceived BF did not stipulate 
any total budget: ‘We didn’t know how much we would need or 
what the other partners would pay’ (more recently BF has agreed 
an annual budget for Phineo which is reviewed every few years 
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but, in eff ect, has no time limit – ‘a very unusual decision for BF 
but if we want to carry on working the way we do we have to have 
on-going support’). When Phineo left  home BF continued to give 
Phineo IT and HR support in addition to funding. ‘Th at’s part of 
the BF style – we don’t want to burden them with administration at 
the beginning’. ‘Th at’s another argument for spin-off s – you can get 
economies of scale’.
One diffi  cult issue was communications. ’Th e exception to wider 
support is communications because we don’t want to stand in the 
front row – but it’s a debate, it’s always a debate between us (the BF 
staff  team involved), Phineo and corporate communications here 
(at BF).’ Th e BF staff  team and Phineo are clear that if Phineo is to 
succeed it must be autonomous, and be seen to be autonomous; 
the corporate communications department say ‘this is such a big 
project and it’s working so well and government likes it so why 
can’t we use it more in our communications’. Th e BF staff  are 
adamant that BF must be very low key while, at the same time, 
recognising the pressure for the foundation to demonstrate its 
worth. ‘It’s exactly the same as with your children. Of course, you 
are proud of them but you have to take a back seat – and just as 
with children they (the off -spring) don’t say “I’m performing so 
well because my parents did this or that”. Occasionally, BF and 
Phineo will bring out a jointly branded publication but these are 
very clearly designed by Phineo and are seen as such’.
Th ere are now 8 key shareholders who own Phineo. Th ese are a mix 
of for-profi t and nonprofi t organisations. Th e shareholders do not 
pay equally – some pay nothing and some pay anything from 100k 
Euros to 1 million Euros. BF makes one of the largest contributions 
but has only 15% of the votes. Partners include KPMG, PWC, 
Stift ung Mercator, Stift erband and NPC. Th e partners/shareholders 
were very deliberately targeted. For profi t partners were seen as 
particularly important because they have money and also because 
Phineo sees itself as a bridge between money/business and the 
social/non-profi t sector.
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Th e view is that a diverse group of partners is crucial not only for 
legitimacy but also because it signals cooperation between unlikely 
players and emphasises that Phineo is building a new concept. But 
for BF: ‘A minority role has many benefi ts but it means you can’t 
impose. If you have a very, very clear idea of what you want then 
it doesn’t work. You have to be prepared for trial and error, and 
experimenting and learning.’
A leading member of the Bertelsmann Foundation Executive 
Board chairs the Phineo Board. Th is was not a contentious matter. 
BF is one of the largest funders and ‘she is the most knowledgeable 
so there was no debate’. To date BF has invested around 7 million 
Euros in Phineo. At present (2013-14) BF gives around 1 million 
Euros to Phineo per annum. It has no set date when it will cease to 
fund Phineo – this is partly because ‘achievement of the mission 
will take a generation’ and partly because Phineo will always be 
dependent on donors because it is supplying public knowledge: 
‘Intellectual property is a real problem for Phineo – a strategic 
debate. We (the foundation) say the knowledge produced by 
Phineo has to be public and if a donor wants additional special 
information then they have to pay for it’. Staff  at BF realise that 
this means that: ‘It is a long term commitment. Like children they 
never really leave you.
Phineo is now growing. Th at has its own challenges for Phineo: 
‘Th ere’s a trade-off  between the confi dence of solid funding and 
maintaining the feeling of a start-up – being innovative and 
keeping that’.
Phineo is now incubating a new pro-bono service organisation 
‘so now I’m on the other side (of the start-up process) and there 
are good arguments to keep it (the new organisation) internal 
because there are so many synergies. However, there are many 
good arguments to set it up independently with a separate brand – 
and probably we will do this’. ‘Being a start-up puts you in a good 
position to do a start-up yourself because you can go to funders 
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and say ‘you know us, we get things done – and now you have an 
opportunity to invest in something new’.
On refl ection, Phineo believes that in its own case the critical 
ingredients were: ‘a working model to show backers; being able to 
quote other stakeholders as on board; the power of the foundation 
as an entrée; and being aware of the danger of being seen as the 
foundation’s baby’.
33
City Bridge Trust and London 
Sustainability Exchange
Th e Parent – Bridge House Estates 
With its origins dating back to the 11th century, Bridge House 
Estates is possibly London’s oldest charity but it was only in the 
1990s that it began general grant-making now under the working 
name of City Bridge Trust (throughout this case the Trust will be 
referred to as CBT). Th e Mayor and the Commonality and Citizens 
of London (oft en referred to as ‘the City of London Corporation’ 
or ‘City Corporation’) is the trustee of Bridge House Estates and 
responsibility for the grant-making activity is vested in the City 
Bridge Trust Committee, made up of elected members of the 
City Corporation. CBT gives total grants of around £15 million 
per annum. It describes its mission as addressing disadvantage 
by supporting charitable activity across Greater London through 
quality grant-making and related activities within clearly defi ned 
priorities. 
Th e Off spring: London Sustainability 
Exchange (LSx)
LSx works in partnership across sectors to ‘reduce London’s 
environmental footprint, improve the lives of London’s 
disadvantaged communities; improve the health of Londoners; 
improve the knowledge and skills of our communities to achieve 
these goals’. Over 10 years aft er its conception LSx continues to 
exist as a now fully independent entity.
Spotting a Gap
In the 1990s concerns about the environment were beginning 
to surface. John Major’s government began talking about 
sustainability and in 1997 when Tony Blair came to power his 
2
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government made it a requirement that local authorities implement 
Agenda 21 (the recommendations of the Rio Earth Summit in 
1992). As one observer commented: ‘in some circles – though by 
no means in all – sustainability was a buzzword of the late ‘90s’.
Th e Trust received applications on this topic but many of the 
applicants were very small organisations that did not fi t the Trust’s 
criteria. Staff  at the Trust believed there was scope for work at a 
more strategic level and in 1998 decided to commission a feasibility 
study to look at what would be necessary to make London 
a sustainable capital.
Developing a Plan
Aft er two years of cross sector consultation and discussion, 
the feasibility study concluded that there was a need for a new 
independent charity co-ordinating, informing and advising 
the public, private and voluntary sectors about issues and good 
practice in sustainable development. 
CBT brought together a consultative group drawing in a range of 
interested voluntary, public and business sector bodies to refi ne 
ideas of what was needed (including Forum for the Future, London 
Councils, Business in the Community, Groundwork, London First, 
London Voluntary Services Council). At this stage some of the 
voluntary sector participants may have hoped that the result would 
be a coalition from which everyone would get a bit of money.
In the event a new organisation was considered necessary because 
none of the existing organisations were delivering what was 
needed, and none were seen as having the capacity to act in 
a network building and, crucially, a cross-sector role.
CBT staff  took the fi ndings of the feasibility study to the Grants 
Committee with a request for a grant of £1.6 million over 5 years 
to create a new organisation.
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Th e purpose of the proposed new organisation – which they 
called London Sustainability Exchange – was ‘to encourage the 
attitudes, investment and behaviour needed to make London a 
more sustainable city, so that it achieves environmental, economic 
and social standards that match or exceed those of other world or 
capital cities, and is acknowledged as a leader in this fi eld’ (paper 
to Committee November 2000).
But this was not to be another voluntary organisation providing 
tangible services in the conventional way. Th e thinking was that 
sustainability ‘needs to be promoted, developed and understood 
as an integrated whole. Applying sustainability principles to 
economic, social and environmental policies is complex. Th ere is 
no easy or absolute solution and no single sector should operate 
in isolation’.
Th e roles of the new organisation were described as including:
  communicating sustainability to the public, private, voluntary 
sector and the business city
  Acting as a focal point for policy makers and practitioners, 
providing up to date information through cutting edge 
Information and Communications technology
 Advocating standards and sharing examples of good practice
  Working together with existing networks and groups involved 
in sustainability
 Building up partnerships
  Exploring integrated or partnership approaches to 
sustainability in London
  Enabling change though training and other forms of capacity 
building across the sectors
It was strongly emphasised that the Exchange would not duplicate 
the work of existing organisations, but would add value and 
work in partnership with those wishing to develop principles of 
sustainability. 
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Why Create a New Organisation?
Several people emphasised: ‘Th e biggest question has to be: why 
are you creating a new organisation’. So was the possibility of 
developing LSx as a programme within CBT considered? One 
staff  member answered: ‘No I don’t think so, though now I suppose 
we might consider that. We wanted to give it independence. 
It doesn’t belong to the Corporation – in this case that was 
important politically – it wasn’t the Corporation telling people 
what to do. But it was probably also important in terms of future 
funding’. And another person commented: ‘Th e Committee 
wanted this to be strictly time limited so a programme within 
CBT wouldn’t have worked.’
Getting Support
Th e fi rst step for CBT staff  was to get the funding proposal 
agreed by the Committee. Th e funding proposal faced at least 
four problems. First, sustainability might be understood in some 
circles but, in the late ‘90s, it was still seen as vague and faddish 
by many. Second, the proposed organisation did not exist – there 
was nothing to see or to assess, except the plans in the proposal; 
the Committee was used to considering applications from 
organisations that already existed and had a track record. Th ird, 
the organisation was not going to ‘solve a problem’ or take action 
in a direct way – it was going to ‘communicate’ and ‘network’ and 
‘build partnerships’. Fourth, the sum of money requested was very 
large relative to the normal run of grants. For all of these reasons 
it is perhaps not surprising that, as one person remarked, ‘some 
members of the Committee found it really hard to get their heads 
round it. Th ey didn’t really get the concept or what exactly this 
organisation was going to do’.
Financial Backing – with Conditions
But ‘sustainability’ was in the air and was being championed by 
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the then Chair of Policy in the Corporation. At around the same 
time as the proposal went to Committee the Corporation created 
a new post concerned with environmental matters. Th ese factors 
worked in favour of the proposal. Nevertheless, and unusually, 
the proposal was taken to a vote and, with some diffi  culty, the 
Committee agreed to an initial grant of £500,000 (I.e. the proposed 
fi rst year only) which was to be ‘subject to stringent monitoring 
and evaluation’ and ‘close communication with the successful 
organisation’. 
It was agreed that if the Committee were satisfi ed that suffi  cient 
progress had been made in the fi rst year a further four years 
tapering support would be available. Each year’s grant was to be 
conditional on a satisfactory independent evaluation, and, in 
addition, the Corporation’s Environmental Coordinator should 
sit on the new organisation’s board and advise the Committee of 
progress. Th e Chief Grants Offi  cer of CBT refused to sit on the 
board believing that this would be ‘too close, too complicated’.
Th e Committee’s year by year approach worried the staff  who 
feared that they would not persuade good applicants to bid without 
a reasonable period in which to achieve results. A guaranteed fi ve 
year frame was seen as especially important given that the whole 
fi eld was under-developed and the sort of strategic, cross-sector 
work envisaged was ambitious and would take time to get going.
A Diffi  cult Birth
Trust staff  were clear that a new organisation was needed – but 
how to get to that outcome? Aft er some consideration the Trust 
decided to put out a call for proposals from charities willing to 
act as ‘midwife’ to a new, independent body or from those willing 
to operate the Exchange as a discrete project within their own 
operational and management systems. ‘In either case the Trust 
wishes to see creative partnerships with other organisations working 
in related areas’ (Committee papers November 2000 Annex 2).
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Th e invitation to bid made the terms of the grant very clear – 
a fi rst grant of £500,000 and a further four years of tapering 
support, annually renewable, and dependent on evaluation and 
close monitoring of progress. Applicants were asked to provide a 
timescale for the whole fi ve years and to explain what would be 
the outcome at the end of each year.
Th e invitation also emphasised that the Trust’s resources for the 
project were fi nite ‘and that its role in supporting the initiative 
is that of a pump-prime funder and it cannot consider ongoing 
revenue funding aft er the initial start-up period. It is therefore 
critical that applicants demonstrate sound business planning and 
have considered from the outset an exit strategy which should be 
built in as part of the proposal’ (Ibid).
With the application papers complete, in June 2000 the Chief 
Grants Offi  cer invited 14 experienced organisations to a briefi ng 
meeting to explain the application process and to discuss the 
fi ndings of the feasibility study. A few months later two consortia 
of charities presented their proposals to an interview panel.
CBT had already supported a number of the organisations in each 
of the two consortia and both gave interesting presentations. Th e 
panel decided to award the grant to the consortium led by Forum 
for the Future. If the Committee still harboured doubts about 
the project, the Chief Grants Offi  cer encouraged them: ‘You have 
awarded a signifi cant grant to a strong organisations backed by 
key partners in the public, private and voluntary sectors. It is likely 
to attract signifi cant publicity from the relevant local London and 
specialist press and it will be seen as a milestone in advancing 
sustainable development which, as you are aware, is a critical issue 
both nationally and on the London agenda. Offi  cers will keep you 
closely informed of all progress’ (Ibid). 
One observer commented: ‘Th e whole model was very clever. You 
minimise the risk of the unknown and the new by a thorough 
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feasibility study, and then you establish the new organisation 
within a well resourced and respected incubator.’ 
Early Years
LSx’s fi rst years were acknowledged by all to be diffi  cult. For the 
CBT Committee ‘it was really hard to understand what LSx was 
about – at fi rst, LSx described itself as sort of hub – for the fi rst few 
years everything was described in terms of concepts. Th ere was 
nothing much that was hard and fast and tangible. Once LSx began 
to get involved in some practical projects then it was easier to get 
it across to them’ (the Grants Committee).
In addition, of course, the new organisation had to be created, 
a CEO and trustees recruited, governance arrangements agreed 
within Forum for the Future, and all the necessary organisational 
systems and processes put in place. And then LSx had to begin to 
carve out a role and establish its value in and across the sectors.
Th e structures and processes ‘were very tightly managed because 
Forum for the Future trustees wanted that assurance; there had 
to be good governance because Forum was incubating LSx for 
independence; money was tightly controlled because Forum had to 
account for that; and the vision was in the bid so that was managed. 
Tensions? Yes of course, just like any other line management there’s 
a balance between clear vision and room for creativity.
Hiring a good CEO is critical’.
Th e early years were complicated by a rapidly changing and, in 
many ways, supportive policy environment. When Ken Livingstone 
was elected Mayor of London he created the London Sustainability 
Commission. Sustainability was now high on the agenda and 
had big money attached to it. While support for environmental 
concerns and sustainability within local government was welcome, 
it meant that LSx had to re-think its own role focusing less on 
galvanising support and more on fi lling gaps and making links.
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For the staff  of CBT this was also a diffi  cult time. ‘I remember 
trying to pin them (LSx) down to some clear objectives, 
deliverables, milestones ….’  ‘I think we felt a bigger responsibility 
(for LSx) because it was a big sum – and also because it was our 
child we’d taken to Committee’.
Launched in 2002, by the end of 2003 LSx was delivering some 
tangible results and making some valuable relationships. Th e LSx 
CEO was a member of the London Sustainability Commission, 
and was using LSx’s independent voice to help drive change within 
the Mayor’s remit.
Growing Up
As promised an independent review of LSx was produced at the 
end of 2003. Th e overall conclusion was that LSx ‘has established 
a strong brand reputation in a relatively short time. Its remit is 
well understood and its publicity, largely through its website, 
is accessible and well used. It is well regarded as a signposting 
organisation and has demonstrated that it has the power and 
authority to convene’ (quoted in Committee papers 29 Jan 2004). 
Th e problems of measuring the impact of a catalyst and broker 
were acknowledged and it was suggested that LSx should develop 
an audit trail for policy advice, so that the impact of particular 
pieces of work can be tracked’.
Th e review notes that any new organisation faces particular risks 
to do with attracting personnel and gaining acceptance. LSx, 
it was reported, has overcome both these risks and the Trust is 
commended for a ‘strategic’ ’imaginative and creative’ piece of 
grant-making. 
Leaving Home
It was always intended that Forum for the Future would act as 
the incubator of LSx and stand back as soon as LSx became an 
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independently constituted charity with its own board. In early 2004 
LSx instructed lawyers to proceed with incorporation and apply for 
charitable registration. At around this time too the original CEO 
left  and a new one was appointed.
Again this was a diffi  cult time. LSx had to apply for its own charity 
registration but the Charity Commission raised questions about 
whether environmental sustainability was a charitable purpose. Th e 
new CEO had been appointed to LSx but then there seemed to be 
questions about whether LSx should be folded into Forum for the 
Future or even closed altogether. CBT continued to press LSx for 
evidence of tangible results to take to the Grants Committee. 
From LSx’s viewpoint: ‘Th e mechanism for infl uence became 
clearer; that we needed to provide examples of sustainability in 
practice in order to demonstrate value, thereby informing policy 
makers. Th is also made seeking funds slightly easier, once people 
could see the benefi ts of working with LSx’. 
One person remembers: ‘Th ere was nothing comfortable about that 
time. LSx was not a comfortable fi t in Forum for the Future; LSx 
had begun to defi ne itself with practical projects – this was not in 
Forum for the Future’s business model – but in some ways that was 
good, we wouldn’t have left  if it had been comfortable. Every step 
of the way was diffi  cult …’ 
By the end of 2004/5 LSx had begun to secure other sources 
of funding independent of CBT. In 2006 CBT made its fi nal 
grant and, as planned, LSx was successfully launched as a fully 
independent organisation no longer attached to Forum for the 
Future and no longer fi nancially tied to CBT.
From Forum for the Future’s viewpoint letting go was timetabled. 
‘From the start there were very clear pathways to independence. 
In the end getting to independence was rather practical – TUPE 
and things like that. Th ere was ‘no wobbling’ on letting go; the 
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timetable was clear and the money would run out’.
Forum for the Future sees 5 years incubation as having been about 
right in this case: ‘But it depends on what the organisation is set up 
to do. You have to be REALLY clear about what good would look 
like, and then you oft en need to be very adaptable’.
From LSx’s now independent viewpoint ‘the really important 
lesson is using an existing NGO as incubator. It was running rather 
like an internal project within an organisation. CBT were very 
smart in designing that in from the beginning‘.
‘Would LSx have survived as a stand alone from the beginning? 
I’m not sure because it’s all about brand and confi dence; the LSx 
launch party was big and it was about big brand and confi dence. 
Without Forum it would have been harder to leap onto the scene 
like that’.
From CBT’s viewpoint: ‘Th e biggest lesson is think strategically 
about how you can have infl uence on what you want to do. 
How do you multiply and magnify rather than doing it all yourself ’.
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Fondazione Cariplo and Social 
Housing (Italy)
Th e Parent – Fondazione Cariplo
Fondazione Cariplo is the largest foundation of banking origin in 
Italy, and one of the largest foundations in Europe, with a corpus of 
over 7 billion Euros. Cariplo spends around 150 million Euros per 
annum in various programmes in arts, culture, education, scientifi c 
research, healthcare and support to disadvantaged people.
Th e Off spring – Fondazione Housing 
Sociale (FHS)
FHS was born in 2004 to further develop a social housing 
programme already run by Cariplo. FHS is one part of a complex 
structure involving an integrated system of local and now national 
funds, built around some key institutional investors (the main 
Italian foundations, insurance companies, banks, pension funds, 
etc.), local investors (small local foundations, local public bodies, 
private real estate investors, cooperatives, etc.) and management 
companies strictly regulated by the Italian Central Bank. 
Th e work of FHS falls under four main headings:
  Th e promotion of ethical fi nancing initiatives, in particular real 
estate funds for social housing
 Testing innovative non-profi t management models
  Developing project designs for sharing and potential 
replication
  Creating public-private partnerships to develop initiatives 
in co-ordination with existing public housing policies
Taken as a whole FHS is part housing project, part ethical 
investment real estate project, part urban regeneration project, part 
3
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neighbourhood building project, part welfare housing project, part 
environment project, part mission related investment, part cross-
sector co-operation project and part service provision project. Th e 
account given here necessarily simplifi es what is an extraordinarily 
rich, multi-faceted initiative.
All of the work of FHS is based on a strong philosophy that social 
housing is not simply about provision of a place to live but is rather 
about a way of living in which multiple services are available and 
shared and community is built.
Spotting the Need
During the 1990s the housing market in Italy was changing in 
several important ways. While Italians have traditionally favoured 
home ownership this was becoming more diffi  cult as house prices 
rose without a proportionate rise in family incomes. In addition, 
the pattern of housing demand was changing with more single 
people, single parent families, immigrants, off -campus students 
and temporary workers. Th e Public Housing sector was focused on 
the very poorest, and was unable to meet the new demands of the 
‘intermediate’ segment of the population – those groups outlined 
above who could aff ord to pay something but could not aff ord 
rising open market rents. Unlike some other European states Italy 
had a very poorly developed social housing sector.
During this period Cariplo was already working in the fi eld of 
social housing calling for proposals and giving grants. But it 
became increasingly clear to those involved that grants could only 
have limited impact and were not going to be suffi  cient to address 
the real problem. Furthermore, the social housing initiatives 
Cariplo wanted to encourage were too complex to be managed only 
through grant-making. 
Th is grant giving phase is still alive and is seen as important in 
giving Cariplo valuable knowledge and networks in the housing 
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fi eld. Th e call for proposals still exists, focusing on the most 
disadvantaged (former prisoners, refugees, migrants, etc.) grants 
are provided to increase the provision of ‘temporary social 
housing’, supporting the start-up phase of small-medium size 
projects, with a high ‘social purpose’ Over a decade Cariplo gave 
around 39 million Euros in grants to around 200 projects. 
Cariplo believes that grants to existing organisations and creating 
new projects both have a place in a foundation’s tool kit. ‘When we 
give grants we get new knowledge and networks and we learn from 
their experience, and we also help public and non-profi t actors 
in our territories grow. But we want dramatic improvements and 
when we don’t fi nd an opportunity for that in a fi eld then we set up 
our own project’. ‘We as a foundation have the capacity to convene 
and to catalyse. Our mission is to change society. A new project is 
a breakthrough – a new way of doing things’.
Th e Birth of FHS
Having seen the need to develop social housing the foundation’s 
fi rst step was to ask Milan Polytechnic University to prepare a 
feasibility study of an autonomous sustainable system to provide 
a range of types of social housing that would not need ‘feeding 
with grants’. In 2003 the feasibility study was delivered and a year 
later Cariplo in partnership with Regione Lombardia and ANCI 
Lombardia (public bodies) created FHS to develop the ideas 
presented in the feasibility study. 
FHS describes its mission as to experiment with innovative 
solutions for structuring, fi nancing, constructing and managing 
social housing initiatives that are economically sustainable and 
not dependent on grants. Social housing is defi ned as ‘the set of 
dwellings and services, actions and instruments addressed to 
those who are unable to meet their housing and related primary 
needs on the open market for economic reasons or due to a lack 
of appropriate supply options’. Whereas public sector housing is 
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primarily for those with incomes below 12,000 Euros, FHS focuses 
on those with incomes between 12,000 – 50,000 Euros, people 
who can aff ord to pay something but have diffi  culty meeting their 
housing needs on the open market.
FHS is independent of Cariplo and is governed by an 8 person 
Board of directors drawn from among the main partners (of whom 
Cariplo is one). In the early years Cariplo supported FHS with set-
up and operating costs; more recently it has given FHS 10 million 
Euros in share capital the income from which covers a percentage 
of FHS operating costs, the rest being covered by professional 
fees received for technical services (architectural, service design, 
business planning, etc.).
Creating an Ethical Fund
One of the fi rst tasks of FHS was to generate an eff ective and 
sustainable business model for social housing initiatives. It did this 
by creating the fi rst real estate ethical fund in Italy (Fondo Federale 
Immobiliare di Lombardia – FIL, former ‘Fondo Abitare Sociale 
1’). With nothing more tangible than a theoretical model and some 
market analysis to show potential investors, this was not easy and 
took months of ‘dialogue, presentations and relationship eff orts’. 
Investors were off ered a return of 3% above infl ation (with a cap 
of 4%) on a long term, 20 year investment. At the time this was 
seen as a very low interest rate (but is now seen as relatively 
attractive) and investors ‘needed to see it as an experiment 
with a social benefi t part’. Nine high-profi le public and private 
organisations were successfully persuaded to invest and the fi rst 
fund closed at 85 million Euros. 
Th ose involved in creating FIL believe that the name and 
reputation of the foundation gave them access and an important 
tool in persuading investors; in addition, ‘in Italy if you persuade 
one bank then others become more confi dent and follow and then 
you use that for other institutional investors’.
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Early Challenges
Th e whole social housing project represented a major challenge 
to the established real estate market. Th e established market was 
based on an average price of 2.5k Euros per square metre. For 
the FHS model to be viable the price per square metre had to be 
no more than 1.3k Euros. ‘It was a big fi ght. Th e developers were 
against it, parts of the media were against it. Th e developers wanted 
to keep on doing business as usual. We kept saying, no, only at 1.3 
k per square metre otherwise there is no project’. Th e reputation 
and brand of Cariplo ‘helped hugely in getting a resolution. It 
could speak with government and with banks. But it couldn’t take 
a strong confrontational position. It is known as very fair so people 
see its position as in the general interest’.
Consolidation and Growth
Th e success of FIL was later used as a basis for setting up a national 
Integrated Funds System (SIF) by the National Housing Plan. Th is 
integrated funds system consists of a national fund of funds (FIA), 
managed by an investment agency headed by the fi rst director 
of FHS and staff ed by a number of people hired from FHS, with 
equity of 2 billion Euros. Th e FIA invests in local real estate funds 
to build social housing units at aff ordable prices, intended for 
families unable to meet their housing needs in the market, but 
with incomes higher than would entitle them to public housing. 
From a policy viewpoint one of the advantages of increasing the 
supply of rented social housing is that it makes labour migration 
more fl exible.
FHS approached the development of social housing as a 
partnership between public and private actors. At local level local 
investors were recruited to pay into a local fund to which the (now) 
national fund also contributes up to a maximum of 60% of total 
equity. FHS plays a co-ordinating and advisory role. Raising local 
equity is a challenge and is described as very, very diffi  cult in the 
Chapter 2  Case Studies – Fondazione Cariplo and Social Housing (Italy)
The Inventive Foundation: creating new ventures in Europe48
current fi nancial environment especially outside metropolitan 
areas and in southern Italy; another challenge is ensuring return 
on investments (3% is now seen as relatively high). Yet another 
challenge is going through the authorisation processes which is 
‘public administration – slow, diffi  cult and a lot about local rules…’  
FHS sees its role as ensuring everything is done properly, sharing 
knowledge and spreading competence in order to ‘create a market 
not just a collection of projects’.
Originally FHS tended to focus on greenfi eld sites but more 
recently has been working mostly on brownfi eld renovations. Sites/
buildings may come from local government giving a concession, 
selling a site, or exchanging a site for shares in the fund. Some 
sites/buildings come from private sellers anxious to sell in a very 
diffi  cult market. Th e national social housing fund is seen as the 
only place where, at present, money is available for purchases and 
development. 
Every project is planned as an urban project involving redefi nition 
of public spaces, traffi  c issues and a functional mix of new 
dwellings; a social project providing commercial services with 
community impact, high impact social services and sometimes 
special residential services; and a fi nancial project involving 
planning and project management. Ideally, all of these elements 
have to be planned and agreed between local stakeholders and 
investors at the outset and built into the implementation agreement 
prior to closing the agreement, and agreement on the tender for 
fi nal building design and development, property allocation and 
property and community management arrangements. 
Clearly, getting to this stage involved a wide range of diff erent 
skills, and ‘is a huge co-ordinating task and it is almost impossible 
to get all agreed at the start but you need to be very clear about the 
nature of the mission and you need to drive the process’. ‘At the 
start it took us about 4 years to get to agreement but now we are 
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managing to do it in 2 years. As you go on you have a customary 
list of ‘to-do’s’ and a clear timetable and so on. Now we’re working 
on standardisation of the processes for replication – we want to 
spread the model’.
FHS summarises the diversifi ed skill sets underlying its integrated 
approach under two main headings: fi nance, and planning and 
development. Th ere are 8 key elements in the FHS approach:
1. Economic and fi nancial planning
2. Social administration of the properties
3.  Defi nition of a reference profi le for the new community 
that ensures a balanced social mix, coordinated with the 
city’s housing policies and applicable regional legislation
4.  Services design – inclusion of local and urban services that 
strengthen relations with the wider neighbourhood and 
collaborative resident services that may promote a sense 
of community and well-being
5.  Architectural design with a focus on defi nition of spaces for 
socialising and interacting both in and outside of buildings
6. Concern for the environment and sustainable life-styles
7. Community start-up and guidance
8. Co-ordination with relevant local policies
A Range of Styles
None of the above fully captures the creativity of the work of 
FHS. One development in a suburb of Milan is a purpose built 
development of 123 dwellings. Th e building was the result of an 
international architectural competition designed also to raise the 
profi le of social housing. Th e decision to mount an international 
competition for the plans was not an easy one. Th e real estate 
project had been full of delays and set backs so when fi nal 
authorisation was obtained people wanted to move ahead as fast 
as possible. Cariplo and FHS resisted the pressure to run ahead 
and insisted on the architectural competition: ‘We wanted it to be 
innovative in terms of social impact. We wanted thinking out of 
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the box in public, private and semi-private spaces.’ Although there 
were worries that the competition might be a waste of time and 
money, the view now is that it was well worth it. 
Th e building incorporates various environmental and technological 
innovations as well as a range of commercial units and public 
spaces for use by the wider neighbourhood. Th ere are also a 
number of garden plots for tenants to cultivate as they choose. 
Th e buildings themselves include a variety of features designed to 
encourage community sharing and building (a communal kitchen 
and laundry, a common ‘party’ room, a hobby room and so on). 
Some units are off ered to voluntary associations who provide 
relevant services to residents and the wider neighbourhood.
Applicants to live in the building were brought together months 
in advance of completion in order to know each other and assess 
their willingness to participate in ‘building a community’ and were 
selected to include a range of ages and family units. Now that the 
tenants have moved in the building managers are working with 
them to identify projects of common interest (such as car pooling, 
book sharing, joint purchasing, etc). As one person at FHS said: 
‘We’re never satisfi ed. Th e dominant idea is that social housing is 
low cost – but we’re doing something diff erent, something really 
high quality: quality of buildings, spaces and services to improve 
quality of relationship and quality of life …’
Another development is a renovation of an old and very beautiful 
building in the centre of Milan. Th e building was privately owned 
and rented out to tenants. For FHS this was an experiment 
‘working on an existing building with people already living there 
with whom we had to negotiate the changes’. Th e building is in a 
culturally diverse area and, when completed, will include a range 
of existing residents, migrants, young people and some people 
with disabilities. Th is building does not have the common spaces 
of the previous example, but 7 million Euros has been invested 
in renovating a park behind the building for the use of the wider 
51
neighbourhood. Th e two commercial spaces in the building have 
been let to a fair trade coff ee outlet and to a clothing recycling/
fashion store – a start-up itself. Th e choice of tenants for the 
commercial spaces is part of a wider goal of social regeneration of 
the neighbourhood. Th e management of this building is another 
experiment; Fondazione Cariplo wanted to encourage non-profi t 
organisations to become more involved in social housing so it 
invited four diff erent organisations to form a consortium (with a 
grant of 1.5 million Euros) to set up a social enterprise to buy part 
of the building and to manage the whole building.
Even more ambitiously FHS is involved in development of a 
targeted 1000 dwellings for young people in Milan. Cariplo is a 
major investor in the scheme. So far 210 dwellings (apartments/
fl ats) spread throughout the city have been acquired from a local 
public entity. Th e aim is to link the young people in an on-line 
community among all of the tenants: ‘creating a community 
with no common space but can be ever changing’. Th e project is 
described as ‘a head-ache to manage, but very important because 
many of the fl ats can’t be sold so if we could develop a model it 
would be very interesting to replicate’.
Next Steps
Now that people are living in the buildings FHS is focussing on 
developing and implementing the social aspects of the projects 
and the fi nancial sustainability of that. ‘Th at’s more diffi  cult than 
just attracting investors because it’s about people, community 
and quality of life. We have to be very constant and precise in 
monitoring the implementation of the projects’. 
In this phase, there is another advantage: ‘We now see the social 
housing developments as laboratories for many of Cariplo’s other 
grant areas – putting in extra ingredients and seeing what happens’. 
Th e greatest challenge is ‘trying to replicate the whole model and 
staying focussed on the social content. It’s about fi nding the right 
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models that are sustainable and replicable’.
Th e project has been complicated and, at times, contentious. 
But those involved believe that it has been worth the work and 
the diffi  culties. Foundations, Cariplo believes, should be ‘more 
entrepreneurial – there are too many tourists in philanthropy’. ‘If 





Th e Parent – Mozaik Foundation
Mozaik Foundation, based in Sarajevo, was established in 2002 
as a foundation to co-ordinate donations and make grants in 
Bosnia Herzegovina. It was then called the NGO Foundation and 
one of its fi rst donations was 170k (Canadian) dollars from the 
Canadian government. Th e new organisation quickly realised that 
one foundation would not work. In 2004, with the help of Harvard 
Business School, the foundation embarked on a major strategy 
planning exercise and as part of that process changed its name to 
Mozaik Foundation.
Th e Off spring: EkoMozaik
EkoMozaik was established in April 2009, when a contract was 
signed with the Municipality of Sekovici (Eastern Repubika Srpska, 
10,000 inhabitants) allowing Mozaik to use a 750,.000 € ex-military 
complex free of charge for a period of 20 years. EkoMozaik is a 
social business designed to provide jobs to the most vulnerable 
population, both Serbs and Bosniaks. EkoMozaik produces honey 
from its own bee-hives (and makes bee-hives), seedlings, salad 
vegetables and fl owers in its greenhouses, and other vegetables 
in the fi elds. EkoMozaik ltd is 100% owned by and linked with 
Mozaik through a corporate governance system developed in 
partnership with the International Finance Corporation.
Mozaik: From Grantmaker to Social 
Entrepreneur
Until the 2004 review almost 100% of the foundation’s resources 
were raised from abroad. Th e strategy planning exercise focused 
on the key question of fi nancial independence and sustainability. 
4
Chapter 2  Case Studies – Mozaik and EkoMozaik – Bosnia Herzegovina
The Inventive Foundation: creating new ventures in Europe54
By the end of the planning exercise the foundation had decided 
to change its name to Mozaik and to broaden its focus beyond 
the non-profi t/civil society arena. ’We realised that civil society 
organisations are not only and not always the best vehicle for 
achieving change. A lot of civil society organisations specialise 
in meeting donor demands rather than meeting needs.’ Another 
result of the review was development of a multi-layer strategy that 
would, among other things, aim at building partnerships with 
governments, business, media, citizens, donors and other non-
profi t organisations. Th inking longer term was unusual at this time 
when most organisations in the country were just looking for the 
next donation.
Mozaik began to develop its own approach to development beyond 
giving grants: Community Driven Development. It was based on 
principles of partnership and mobilisation of local resources to 
address local issues, educating and mobilising for long term impact. 
‘Th e idea was to mobilise the community to work on a project for 
common good. It was a way of building trust, working in communities 
where until recently people had been killing each other’. 
Mozaik also began thinking about building an endowment. In a 
region where immediate needs ruled fundraising talking about an 
endowment was diffi  cult, and in some ways not helped by the fact 
that Mozaik was receiving substantial funds from USAID: ‘why 
give 5 Euros to an organisation with thousands and for nothing 
immediate?’. Charles Stuart Mott Foundation saw the possibilities 
and gave the fi rst half million Euros to be used as a 2 for 1 
matching fund.
Th e organisational budget increased from € 0.32 million in 2004 
to € 0.7 million in 2008. Locally mobilised resources contributed 
50% to the total cost of community-led activities. By 2008 Mozaik 
was already known and recognised in the country, especially by 
municipal authorities. Links were made into almost all layers of 
society and the leadership of the foundation was starting to think 
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about the next fi ve year plan.
In 2008 Mozaik leadership met again to discuss strategy. Financial 
sustainability, they realised, was diff erent from having short term 
funds. Mozaik knew that donors might move on, and funds from 
political parties were hazardous in that ‘once you get funding 
from one political party you are marked as their baby – so you 
have to work very hard and carefully to get money from all of 
them or from none’. In short, increased fundraising might do 
little for Mozaik’s sustainability nor for its independence. Th e 
alternative path – investing in social businesses – would be a 
much riskier undertaking, but would result in greater benefi t for 
local populations and, at the same time, help to maintain Mozaik’s 
independence. 
Before creating EkoMozaik, Mozaik had already been involved in 
the creation of one social business and another non-profi t start-up. 
Th e other social business was Mašta Agency (Imagination), 
a marketing agency owned and housed by Mozaik. Th e business 
was started because Mozaik realised that it was spending 
considerable sums of money on marketing, design, events etc. 
for products and services that were not always quite as they would 
have wished: ‘really we were doing the work and they were getting 
the credit’. So they decided to create their own company and sell 
its services to others in the open market. Th e Mozaik Board loaned 
Masta 8,000 Euros for start-up costs which it paid back more than 
twice over in less than a year. 
Mozaik’s other start-up was Populari – a public policy think tank. 
Populari was started because Mozaik believed that its work had 
to be informed by sound research. ‘Populari informs our work and 
our cases inform their work. We need public policy people but we 
are activists’. Initially, Populari and Mozaik worked closely together 
but then separated, although Mozaik continues to sit on Populari’s 
board.
Chapter 2  Case Studies – Mozaik and EkoMozaik – Bosnia Herzegovina
The Inventive Foundation: creating new ventures in Europe56
Finding an Opportunity to Fill a Need
EkoMozaik was born, in part, from extreme frustration. ‘Every 
time we went into a community and asked what people most 
needed the answer was jobs. We’d say ‘sorry we can’t do that’. 
But we were feeling more and more frustrated that we claimed to 
be about needs but we couldn’t work on the number one priority. 
We and our donors were happy to work on rights, democracy and 
so on but those depend on jobs in a stable economy’.
Mozaik wanted to provide employment. It also wanted to break 
away from long term dependence on donors. And it believed 
that it had developed expertise and networks that equipped it 
for a real business challenge. ‘We wanted a business that would 
provide jobs to pull people out of poverty in a sustainable way, we 
wanted to empower women in a sustainable way; we wanted to do 
reconciliation in a sustainable way’. But what sort of project could 
combine those goals?
Once the decision was made to start a social business the search for 
partners started. Soon aft er Mozaik met with representatives of the 
Czech Embassy in Sarajevo to discuss potential cooperation. Aft er 
some discussion the Czech Ministry of Agriculture agreed to fund 
development of an organic bee-keeping business with an initial 
gift  of € 400,000. Mozaik committed an additional € 100,000 to 
the project and € 150.000 were borrowed from Sparrkasse BiH on 
favourable terms. So Mozaik had a business idea and some money 
but where to locate the largest bee-keeping business in the country?
Mozaik contacted several small municipalities in the country 
looking for help with a location. As noted above, in April 2009, 
a contract was signed with the Municipality of Sekovici (Eastern 
Repubika Srpska, 10,000 inhabitants) that created the biggest 
public private partnership in the region and enabled Mozaik to use 
a € 750,000 ex-military complex free of charge for 20 years. In part 
the willingness of the Municipality to work with Mozaik may have 
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been due to the fact that Mozaik had already started a Youth Bank 
in the area – ‘so they knew us and trusted us’. Now, at last, Mozaik 
had the ingredients for a new social business.
Starting a business in this region is complicated. Bosnia 
Herzegovina ranks 163rd on the World Bank index of ease of doing 
business; the structure of government is complex and overlapping, 
procedures and permissions take months if not years and 
corruption is endemic at all levels. Once you have a business and 
employees the problems do not end there. Th ere is a saying in the 
region that it is easier to divorce someone than to fi re them.
Developing the Organisation: Early Years
At the start EkoMozaik focused on growing lavender and keeping 
bees to make honey. Th e hives were made on site with wood from 
the forest; EkoMozaik is now being asked to supply hives for sale. 
Staff  set about clearing the land. So far 20 acres of 39 acres available 
have been cleared and prepared for growing. An additional grant 
of $2million was obtained from USAID to build a 501,700 square 
metre greenhouse. With this facility production of salad vegetables, 
other fl owers, and seedlings began. 
Th e location was a wonderful gift  but it was not without problems. 
First, it was a barracks and land but the land had to be cleared of 
forest and prepared for planting before it was of any use. Second, 
the site was high in the mountains along a rutted dirt track road 
that is only negotiable by tractor when the snow comes. One by-
product of the EkoMozaik development is that for the fi rst time the 
two local political parties have cooperated to arrange maintenance 
of the track. Th ird, while the height means that the air is pure it 
also means that the snows can be heavy and winter temperatures 
very low (minus 30 degrees in some years). Two years ago there 
was one metre of snow on the greenhouse roof creating a real 
danger of collapse; ten staff  worked day and night to reduce the 
weight of snow on the roof. Fourth, when EkoMozaik fi rst set up 
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there was no mobile phone or internet coverage. Fift h, the very 
rural location and the altitude make simple things like getting 
fuel and supplies diffi  cult and expensive, and of course add to 
EkoMozaik’s own transport costs, as well as making it diffi  cult 
to fi nd staff  who are prepared to live in the area. Last, but not least, 
Sekovici is a wholly Serbian community; ‘you wouldn’t expect 
an organisation in Sarajevo to invest in a Serbian community so 
it was a very very big statement for us to do that’. Th is also later 
created some ill-feeling among the Serbian women workers when 
a Bosniak agronomist was appointed – ‘they didn’t like it but then 
they realised he was there to help grow the business and it’s ok now’.
Th e early years were diffi  cult. One problem was fi nding expert 
staff  – an agronomist and an accountant etc. – who understood 
the purposes of the project and were prepared to work in such a 
remote location. Th e women employed from the village also found 
it diffi  cult to understand what was expected from them. Th e village 
has around 90% unemployment and for many of the women this 
was their fi rst job. In addition they were told that this was a ‘social 
business’ run by a foundation – this may have sent the message that 
this was charity/aid and so did not need to be treated like a ‘real’ 
job. In the early days pilfering was sometimes a problem.
Once the site began to produce honey and other produce the 
problem was to fi nd buyers. ‘People didn’t know us, they didn’t 
trust us. It was really really hard’. Th e liability of newness was 
compounded by other factors. Th e altitude and non-use of 
pesticides and artifi cial sugars mean that EkoMozaik produce is 
very high quality but because of the methods used and transport 
costs it also tends to be more expensive than some other produce. 
Th e fruit and vegetable market is also, by its very nature, diffi  cult. 
Salad goods have a short shelf life and there may be considerable 
waste. Both honey and other produce are subject to the vagaries of 
weather aff ecting both production and consumption. Th e market 
in Bosnia Herzegovina is further complicated by at least three other 
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factors. First, buyers are reluctant to sign contracts and some take 
the goods but do not pay. Second, there is a degree of corruption. 
Th ird, in recent years there has been a move for ‘people to go back 
to their roots, so growing stuff  is now more popular. Most people 
grow at least some things for themselves and there are more local 
markets’.
Slowly, however, EkoMozaik began to fi nd buyers including one 
chain of local supermarkets.
Consolidation
By early 2014 EkoMozaik has worked through many of its earlier 
diffi  culties. It is still fi nding it diffi  cult to recruit an agronomist 
and, of course, altitude and climate remain challenges. Th is year 
the winter has been particularly mild and there are fears that bees 
leaving the hives too early will die for lack of food. 
EcoMozaik is slowly becoming better-known – particularly for 
the quality of its honey and seedlings. Open Society Fund BiH has 
given € 50,000 to improve the production and marketing of bee-
hives. It has recently been asked to experiment with growing a rare 
type of onion that has never been raised in a greenhouse before, 
and there are high hopes of a major contract for salad stuff s. A new 
marketing manager has recently been appointed but marketing 
remains a challenge. Th ere are other logistical problems including 
getting the greenhouse heating right, as well as developing a 
management style appropriate to the culture and expectations of 
the employees. Balancing social and fi nancial (for-profi t) goals 
remains challenging.
As an employment project EkoMozaik is undoubtedly successful. 
At the peak of the planting and growing season it employs over 
160 women from the local area. One interesting eff ect of this is that 
men are less likely to leave the family to seek work in Russia and 
Montenegro.
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Mozaik remains upbeat about its ‘baby’. ‘Creating jobs has been an 
amazing tool to get local Mayors on board and the media love it. 
We can now go to places as the people who created EkoMozaik’. 
Th e location has been diffi  cult but ‘if we can make this work there 
then we can do it anywhere’. Mozaik is now using the lessons 
learned from the challenges of EkoMozaik to inform and develop 
its other work. Perhaps most importantly ‘It has made us really 
think about what the real problems are and how to address them – 
not just accepting what other organisations do’.
61
One Foundation and Headstrong 
(Ireland)
Th e Parent – One Foundation
One Foundation was started by Declan Ryan in 2004, with Deirdre 
Mortell as co-founder and CEO. One Foundation was founded on 
the principle of ‘giving while living’ and very early on a decision 
was made to spend out over ten years. Over the ten years of its life 
One Foundation started several new organisations including Social 
Entrepreneurs Ireland, Stand Up for Children and Headstrong. 
All of One Foundation’s work was informed by a strong venture 
philanthropy approach with the founders involved in all decisions. 
Th e foundation’s key areas of interest were minority communities, 
disadvantaged children and families, mental health and social 
entrepreneurship in Ireland. One Foundation closed its doors as 
planned in December 2013.
Th e Off spring – Headstrong
Headstrong is a national body based in Dublin. Headstrong’s 
Vision is:
‘Our Vision is an Ireland where young people are connected to 
their community and have the resilience to face challenges to their 
mental health. Its mission is to change how Ireland thinks about 
young people’s mental health through the Jigsaw Programme of 
service development, through Research and Advocacy.’
 
Headstrong describes its aims as to improve mental health & 
wellbeing outcomes for young people in Ireland by:
  Working with Health Services Executive and others to get state 
mental health services working better for young people
  Working with communities on mobilising around mental 
health and well-being for their young people 
  Providing innovation funds and technical supports to support 
5
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and incentivise changed ways of delivering youth mental health 
services. Funds are matched from within the community / local 
agencies
Once developed Headstrong emphasised three elements in its role: 
service development – Jigsaw – a Headstrong developed innovative 
programme that works with communities to off er timely, accessible 
and appropriate youth friendly mental health support; advocacy on 
young people’s behalf and empowering young people to advocate 
for themselves; and research for future programme development 
and advocacy.
One Foundation invested 6.2 million Euros over the fi rst 5 years 
of Headstrong’s life, with a further 4 million allocated for 2012-14 
(see below).
Identifying a Need
When One Foundation began it saw itself as very much a venture 
philanthropy organisation, focused on supporting and growing 
already existing organisations rather than starting anything new. 
Very early on One was aware that there was a growing youth 
mental health problem in Ireland but ‘mental health didn’t tick 
the (scaling and growth) boxes so we put it on the back burner 
to start with’. By 2006, at the height of the Celtic Tiger economy, 
the statistics clearly showed that there was a mental health crisis 
among young people – but no one was talking about it. None of 
the staff  at One had a mental health background and everyone was 
unsure what to do. But there was a feeling that something had to be 
done. So One hired an Irish economist who had worked on mental 
health advocacy in Australia. Th ey began by mapping what was 
being done in Ireland and discovered that almost all services were 
provided by the state with very few non-profi t providers on the 
scene. 
In January 2006 the government published a new mental health 
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policy document: “A Vision for Change”; the document was seen as 
forward looking but the section on youth mental health was among 
the weaker parts of the whole. From One’s perspective mental 
health-focused non-profi t organisations operated in silos divided 
by illness such as schizophrenia, depression, eating disorders, and 
so on; as a result, a broad mental health agenda had been slow 
to develop. One Foundation recognised that youth services and 
schools were paying increasing attention to youth mental health as 
suicide became an increasing concern, but many seemed unsure 
what to do and how to respond.
‘We would have preferred to fund someone else to address this – 
but there wasn’t anyone so we had to do it’. Th e One Foundation 
Advisory Group met and asked themselves ‘How much do we 
really care about mental health? Do we care enough to jump over 
the barrier – we had always said we don’t do start-ups?’. 
By this time One had become involved in promoting social 
entrepreneurship in Ireland and when this took off  One realised 
that ‘we were holding it back and we had to let it go’ and so it 
was spun out to become a new, separate organisation. Now it was 
argued that One was already involved in a start-up, so why not 
this one in youth mental health where the need was increasingly 
obvious?
But still there were anxieties: there was no existing, similar (non-
profi t) provision so One would be not just starting an organisation 
but a whole fi eld; how would it feel to be a founder rather than 
‘just a piece of the pie’; would it be possible to bring in other 
funders; and, crucially, could One create a model that would work? 
One already knew that it had a ten year life and that meant that 
the focus on exit was there from the beginning, addressing some 
anxieties about on-going responsibility and exit, but creating 
others in relation to the short timeframe for exit.
Th ere were other issues. One had the business/start-up skills, but 
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little knowledge and expertise in the fi eld. In addition, there was 
nothing to ‘see’: ’Most of the time One was investing in something 
you could already see. With Headstrong there was nothing, they 
had to invest in an idea’. And it was a radical model: ‘If I look back 
I’m not sure I would have invested in us – it was such a wild idea’. 
Opportunity Development
Having decided to go ahead, One Foundation commissioned a 
feasibility study, looking for a model based on international best 
practice that would fi t the Irish situation. Th e person appointed to 
undertake the feasibility study was very deliberately hired with a 
view to him becoming CEO of the nascent organisation – he had 
the experience and the ideas. Th e hope was that hiring a potential 
CEO as the person to undertake the feasibility study would build 
joint ownership of the project from the start. ‘he knew about 
mental health, we knew about start-ups and managing – but it had 
to be something we both owned’. Both One and the CEO agree that 
the early meetings (what one person called ‘the dating process’) 
‘were very ‘awkward. I spoke Latin, they spoke Swahili – and 
neither of us really got the other’.
Th e feasibility study produced a model that One, and the 
consultant/potential CEO saw as worth trying. It was agreed that 
this would indeed need to be a new organisation rather than a 
programme within One because it needed to interact with other 
services independently of any funder, and it would need to be there 
for the long term whereas One’s life was very limited.
‘Th e fact that One had a ten year life was very, very defi ning – we 
wanted to make permanent changes so we needed to look at how 
we could lock things into the landscape. And in many ways having 
that limit saved us a lot of pain and heartache although it did not 
mean we could by-pass the sustainability issue’.
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Making It Happen
Headstrong was born early in 2007 with an initial investment 
from One Foundation of 1.3 million Euros. One Foundation’s 
vision was that one day, mental health, like physical health, would 
be considered central to an individual’s wellbeing, and services 
would be appropriate and available in whatever form and location 
was most benefi cial. Headstrong described its mission as to 
signifi cantly improve the life experiences of people touched by 
mental health problems in Ireland. 
One saw its investment in Headstrong as being designed to:
1. Produce better information about mental health 
2. Reduce stigma (through advocacy and public education) 
3.  Enhance services (at local community level, Board paper 2008)
Headstrong saw itself as the only youth mental health focused 
organisation and positioned itself between the mental health 
nonprofi t organisations, state services (HSE – primary and 
secondary care), and youth services, collaborating with all.
One Foundation played a very active, hands on role in 
Headstrong’s birth. One set up the company, arranged charitable 
status, hired the CEO (the original consultant – but only aft er an 
open advertisement) and then worked closely with the CEO to 
hire the fi rst staff . In addition, One seconded a member of staff  to 
work with the CEO on putting in place the necessary governance 
and management structures and processes. One Foundation’s 
co-founders both sat on the Board and played a ‘very active’ 
part, helping with, among other things, funding networks and 
plans, as well as recruiting (with the CEO) other Board members. 
One potential danger of this was that the foundation’s One and 
Headstrong ‘hats’ were sometimes unclear.
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Early Years
‘Th e most diffi  cult thing at the start was trying to sequence the 
actions so they were do-able – you needed to do them all, but there 
was only one person at that stage’. ‘Building relationships takes 
time but we were in a hurry. When other people looked at us they 
saw rich people in a hurry – so we had to build trust and that took 
time’. ‘It was a spider’s web of relationships and services.’
As relationships developed there were new challenges for One 
Foundation. One was keen to keep the management of Headstrong 
on track – keeping them urgent and focussed on young people, not 
getting sucked into the state services culture. We had to help them 
stay in the middle’. 
From Headstrong’s viewpoint One had to understand the 
complexity of the existing systems, that change would take time 
and that putting money on the table could not ‘buy’ agreement to 
change. 
From the outset One Foundation was conscious of the dangers of 
Headstrong being identifi ed as a ‘One Foundation project’ thus 
potentially deterring other funders from contributing. ‘We were 
aware of the risk but decided we wouldn’t worry. We would put 
in as much as was needed at the outset and then insert conditions 
each year about other funders coming in – they had to have the 
state come in in year one … We couldn’t possibly wait until the end 
to ask them in otherwise they would say ’no way, it’s yours’. ‘We 
were always aware of the risk – but we weren’t afraid of it’. 
Over time, Atlantic Philanthropies, O2 and both national and local 
government all came to the table.
By 2007 Headstrong had a turnover €1.1m, 10 staff  (9 FTE), and 
one site in Galway. In 2008 Headstrong received another grant of 
over half a million Euros from One Foundation in order to prepare 
a 3 year Business Plan for 2009-11.
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One had played the role of entrepreneur and venture capitalist. 
From Headstrong’s point of view: ‘Philanthropy has a tremendous 
capacity to build. Without One we couldn’t have built the model so 
people could see it’. 
Consolidation
Headstrong’s goals and expected progress for 2007-9 were to:
1.  Establish local youth mental health demonstration services 
in at least 5 communities in Ireland. More specifi cally, they 
wanted:
  Jigsaw Galway implemented and on track (fi rst site)
   2 further sites approved as full Jigsaw sites ; and 2 further 
pipeline sites approved
   Produce a short manual and multi media resources on the 
Jigsaw model to facilitate faster replication
2.  Forge a new national partnership for action on youth mental 
health. More specifi cally to:
   Secure institutional support for the Jigsaw model from 
HSE, mental health professionals, and Offi  ce of the Minister 
for Children
   Become Ireland’s leading source of expertise on youth 
mental health by raising profi le, undertaking research and 
developing resources and materials
3.  Secure a signifi cant Government-philanthropic partnership to 
implement this plan. More specifi cally Headstrong hoped to:
  Secure support from One Foundation and others
  Build a fundraising programme
Consolidation for new organisations, much like adolescence, 
is inevitably a diffi  cult time of experimenting and proving 
competence and capacity. For Headstrong this was a particularly 
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diffi  cult time because it coincided with the dramatic fall of the Irish 
economy. For One Foundation this was a diffi  cult time because, so 
close to its end date, it had to re-write all its exit plans in the light 
of changed economic circumstances. ‘Aft er some badly bruised 
knees we started to work it out and we worked well together’.
Independence and Exit?
In 2013 Headstrong should have been on the fi nal strait to 
independence. One Foundation’s fi nal 1 million Euros investment 
(before One wound up in December 2013) was due to be agreed in 
July triggered by future funding from the national government. 
In July 2013 Headstrong received an informal commitment 
of further government funding. A grant of 1.6 million Euros 
from the Irish Government was confi rmed in December 2013, 
thus triggering, as agreed, a fi nal grant of 1 million Euros from 
One Foundation. In addition, the government’s Mental Health 
Operational Plan included a commitment to an operational review 
of Jigsaw including options for sustainable funding models. Th e 
review is seen as good news for Headstrong but like all voluntary 
organisations in Ireland it has to continue to live with year by year 
government funding decisions.
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Soros Foundation Latvia and 
Cultural Brigades
Th e Parent – Soros Foundation Latvia 
Th e Soros Foundation Latvia (SFL) was founded in 1992 as one 
of the foundations established by George Soros in all countries 
previously part of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Th e strategy 
of the SFL changed over time, but the focus has remained on 
promoting open society values – the rule of law, democratic 
governance, transparency, respect for human and minority 
rights, strong civil society, and individual liberty, guided by the 
overarching idea that an open society is one where nobody has a 
monopoly on the truth. However, SFL has also always emphasised 
the need for affi  rmative action in supporting and defending the 
weak, the marginalized, in pursuing public good and ultimately 
building a good society where everyone not only has equal 
opportunities but also security. Since 1992 SFL has invested over 
USD 80 million for the creation of an open society in Latvia.
Th e foundation describes its work in three main phases. In the fi rst 
phase the goal was to help individuals understand that they can 
aff ect and are responsible for their own lives and their community; 
in this phase grant rounds were very open: ‘It was let a 1000 fl owers 
bloom approach’. In the second phase the emphasis was on building 
structures and institutions for a vibrant civil society. In this phase 
SFL was heavily involved in educational programmes, creating 
public benefi t institutions and developing links between Latvia and 
the world through, for example, travel grants as well as translation 
of some key works into Latvian. Th e foundation was also involved 
in developing contemporary arts, library programmes across the 
region, supporting philanthropy development, and human rights 
initiatives. During this period the Soros Centre for Contemporary 
Arts – Riga, later the Latvian Centre for Contemporary Arts 
(LCCA) was set up. 
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Th e third phase aimed at strengthening the public policy process 
by providing fellowships to young researchers for policy analysis, 
providing expertise to the government in the policy-making 
process, advocacy and monitoring. It was in this third phase that 
the Centre for Public Policy, PROVIDUS was established by SFL. 
In this period SFL was also involved in the encouragement and 
development of community foundations in Latvia. 
Some of these new organisations were created as programmes 
within the foundation and then spun off  (as with Providus and 
LCCA). Another way of creating new organisations was by 
‘counselling and funding the creation of new NGOs in key areas of 
public interest’. Yet another approach was to encourage individuals 
with passion and give them money. In some cases SFL worked with 
others to create new institutions.
Th e foundation is now moving into a fourth phase of ‘transition’ 
in which all Open Society foundations that are now part of the 
European Union are being ‘spun off ’. SFL received its last tranche 
of money in October 2013 which it has invested in the hope that 
this will fund its administration. SFL will be changing its name and 
looking for funds. 
Th e Off spring(s) – Cultural Brigades
Th e Cultural Brigades initiative was begun in 2010 and was 
designed to build ‘creative, sustainable entrepreneurship based in 
arts and culture which deals with social issues and contributes to 
raising the quality of life in communities’.
It was funded by a grant given to SFL from the Open Society 
Emergency Fund, created to help communities in need during the 
economic downturn, on the basis of a proposal developed by staff  
at SFL. Th e initiative was implemented by the Latvian Centre for 
Contemporary Art, an SFL ‘spin-off ’ and an organization with past 
experience in projects engaging the arts for social change. 
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In the event there were two calls for proposals for Cultural Brigades 
funding. In the fi rst phase 14 awards were made and in the second 
phase 31 awards (17 in regions and 14 in Riga). In the fi rst round 
the competition was entirely funded by SFL and confi ned to the 
city of Riga. In the second phase, other municipalities beyond 
Riga were asked if they wished to contribute on a 50:50 basis. Five 
towns agreed to do so. In both rounds expert selection panels were 
recruited to make decisions regarding winners of the awards. In the 
fi rst round every selected proposal received about 7,000 Euros and 
in the second round awards varied depending on the decisions of 
the local panels.
Although the emphasis varied slightly between rounds every 
proposal had to be in the fi eld of arts and culture, had to have a 
business plan with some hope of sustainability, and had to have 
a ‘social’ or a community element. 
By the end of the programme in 2013 44 awards had been made 
and 40 Cultural Brigade initiatives were still operating. 
Spotting an Opportunity in Crisis
Social entrepreneurship was part of SFL’s third phase areas of 
activity. Th is came to be seen as especially important in light of the 
economic crisis of 2009 which hit Latvia especially hard, resulting 
in emigration, public funding cuts of 30%, and eff ects on everyone’s 
salary. It became increasingly clear that the old jobs were not 
going to come back, so the issue was how to build a new future for 
people.
One of the very obvious eff ects of the economic crisis in Riga was 
the number of empty shops and buildings. Th e arts and artists 
had been hit especially hard by the crisis but were beginning 
to ‘fi ght back’ and discuss ways of surviving. When in 2009 the 
Open Society Foundation head offi  ce in New York announced a 
call for proposals for an emergency fund for Europe SFL saw the 
Chapter 2  Case Studies – Soros Foundation Latvia and Cultural Brigades
The Inventive Foundation: creating new ventures in Europe72
opportunity creatively to marry arts and culture, empty city spaces 
and entrepreneurship with a social and community element. 
All 20 Open Society foundations in the region submitted project 
proposals to be assessed by the Emergency Fund Working Group. 
‘It was a bit confusing because they asked for sustainability but 
some crisis projects don’t need to be sustainable. So it took months 
and that didn’t help with partners who were ready to go’.
‘Latvia was particularly aff ected by the economic crisis. Th e arts 
had provided a lot of economic growth and then were very badly 
hit. Th e creative community started putting on events as a way of 
coping and using empty spaces. We saw that artists were examples 
of a way of coping and being creative about crisis. We wanted 
to spread that more widely, but we still wanted to get artists and 
creative people involved. Th en we said it has to be sustainable 
– not grant dependent; and then we added empowerment and 
inspiration to others. Th e original brigades were pilots. Th e 
idea was that it would be a virus that would spread. So it was 
a competition open to all, open space, accessible’.
SFL draft ed a proposal to develop ‘cultural brigades’ (brigade in 
Latvian means team in English) which would, revive morale, unify 
people in cultural fi elds with a long term vision, involve others, 
reinvigorate city streets and neighbourhoods, provide a seed bed 
for new enterprises, and involve a clear ‘social’/non-business 
element. Every project had to be located in the city of Riga. Th e 
proposal was for two rounds of competition but there was some 
concern about the risks involved and doubt about the sustainability 
of the projects, so it was agreed that the Emergency Fund grant 
would be for one round in the fi rst instance, and if this went well 
another round would be funded. Aft er an evaluation of the fi rst 
round both rounds were funded and the initiative was awarded 
around 370,000 Euros in total.
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Putting the Plan into Action
Th e fi rst step was to make people aware of the programme and 
encourage them to apply. Seminars and events were organised 
both to publicise the programme and to bring people together 
and help them with putting together feasible proposals. ‘We did a 
sort of speed dating between people with ideas and with landlords 
of empty properties. Giving practical help to applicants before 
they applied got publicity, and even business newspapers wanted 
to write about the individuals in brigades projects’. In some cases 
applicants were helped to adapt ideas so that they might be more 
sustainable, in other cases they were helped to see how they could 
strengthen the social element. In one workshop a cultural historian 
and a paper artist met and developed a paper making business 
idea building on an old, famous town, love story legend. ‘Th e 
workshops were about getting people involved and helping them 
come up with ideas and business plans, and creating a buzz and 
a community’.
Th e expert panels met and selected ‘winners’. Th ose awarded a 
grant varied hugely and some had a stronger social element than 
others. For example, one project was for a shoe making business. 
Shoe making is an old Latvian craft . Th e project is now a very 
successful business and those involved are inspiring role models 
but ‘its low on the social element – but it was clear it would work 
and we needed some early successes’.
Another project was a rug-making workshop. Beautiful rugs 
are made entirely from waste products (old t-shirts, scrap from 
a leggings and a lingerie factory) and the people employed are 
older women who for various reasons would fi nd it hard to enter 
the mainstream labour market. Five women are employed at 
present paid a small salary and a percentage on sold rugs. ‘Of 
course, we can’t be 100% effi  cient because we have a lot of health 
issues and because I don’t want my ladies working 10 hour days 
– and sometimes we stop for a yoga session or something – that’s 
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important’. One particularly striking range of rugs is made up of 
diff erent coloured squares; each square is made from one t-shirt. 
Th is range has just been accepted for a design award and will be 
sold in an up-market craft  shop in Riga (with a 70% mark up).
One early project was a plant exchange point, which later included 
a cafe, and then a plant hotel. ‘It ran for 2 years and we were 
amazed at the range of people it attracted. In the end it closed 
partly because it was fi ned 700 Euros for a music licence; the fi ne 
led to huge publicity, and there were pro bono lawyers working to 
save it’. 
Another project makes glasses, bowls etc from old bottles and now 
has a small shop and showroom on an increasingly fashionable 
street in Riga (where several other Cultural Brigades projects have 
also located, thus changing the profi le of what had become a rather 
run down street).
Th e Cultural Brigades programme attracted huge local publicity. 
Publicity for the initiative helped everyone. One project was not 
news but a whole programme was, and ‘the media love them 
because they like talking about and sharing what they do whereas 
some entrepreneurs are very secretive until they’ve made it a 
success’.
In interviews with Cultural Brigades projects it was striking 
that all say that the publicity and being part of a team with huge 
newspaper coverage was as important as the money. In one case 
(a music school for adults) the entrepreneur said ‘Really we could 
have got the money but what we really wanted was the brand, the 
marketing’.
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Th e Second Round
Th e second phase was a little diff erent from the fi rst. In the second 
phase there was more emphasis on the social and community 
element because of increasing questioning about whether it was the 
job of a foundation to be creating businesses. 
Th e second phase was also diff erent in that it set out to expand 
beyond Riga and to involve fi ve local municipalities. Municipalities 
were invited to come into the programme with 50:50 co-funding 
in order to both raise awareness and to encourage a sense of 
ownership. ‘We wanted to have a region in the East and the West 
etc – but not all were able to co-fund, get organised, and make 
decisions because there wasn’t much time, so then we sent out an 
open call. We were very surprised because the small municipalities 
were more interested’. Whereas Riga was not as interested (partly 
because it had its own small competition, and partly because it 
probably saw the scale as too small), small municipalities were 
particularly interested because they wanted to develop their 
experience in this area and because ‘it was a bigger deal to them – 
and they had lots of empty space’.
Th e second phase was not only bigger in geographical scope but 
also built on the publicity generated by the fi rst Brigades. Th ere 
were 92 applications in Riga and another 50 from the regions. ‘We 
even had people calling to ask where is the competition’. In the fi rst 
round the maximum grant was 7000 Euros. In the second round 
grants varied depending on local costs and on the size of the total 
pot available in that area. 
In some areas it was a condition of the grant that the project be 
located in the Old Town in order to contribute to re-generation. 
In some ways this made it harder for projects both because such 
places were not thriving and because the types of building/space 
required were not easily available.
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For the municipalities there have been a number of advantages in 
being part of the Cultural Brigades and several intend to continue 
with programmes of their own. 
In some places Brigades projects have provided a base for other 
new community initiatives. Another advantage has been that 
buildings are being used and taken care of and new people are 
being attracted to visit and work in the area. Some municipalities 
have worked hard to encourage the projects and in one town 
organised ‘clean-up Saturdays’ throughout the summer in order to 
clear an old building for use.
Th e Cultural Brigades programme has also helped some 
municipalities to re-think their image and cultural positioning. 
‘Brigades enabled tourism to get support for the idea of workshop 
spaces in some old buildings because I could immediately say I 
know 15 artists wanting space’.
Municipalities gained from the visibility of the brand of the 
Cultural Brigades, and gained experience to run their own 
programmes. One important lesson has been the need to put in 
more support from the city including help with getting permits and 
with marketing using the city’s existing networks. 
More generally, the Cultural Brigades programme has introduced 
the notion of social enterprise to Latvia. For the last 5 years SFL 
has put on a Social Enterprise Forum – a 3 day event – for Riga and 
others. Part of the Forum is about exploring the notion of social 
enterprise in creating liveable cities, inspiring social entrepreneurs 
and explaining the notion of social business to municipalities. ‘Th e 
Brigades have pioneered social enterprise and made it real’.
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Support
It was always part of the Cultural Brigades plan to have an on-
going network of brigades who could support each other. At the 
beginning there were workshops and events where ’brigadiers’ 
could meet, and now they do it themselves, calling each other as 
and when needed. As one person said: ‘Being alone with your 
crazy idea and we created support – it’s a bit like alcoholics its 
easier to do it together’. Use of the network varied over time: ‘It was 
really like feeling part of a family – at the beginning we were all 
at the same stage, the same problems, and then we had a lot more 
contact’.
In the second phase of the programme the nearby (Riga) 
Stockholm School of Economics Mentoring Club – partly funded 
by SFL – collaborated with the Brigades programme. Th ese pro 
bono mentors could be called upon for support. Th eir value 
seems to have varied in part in relation to the brigadier’s ability to 
conceptualise his/her problem in order that the right mentor could 
be identifi ed. Some mentors understood ‘the social bit, others 
didn’t get it’.
Th roughout both phases of the programme SFL and LCCA have 
tried to continue to help participants to obtain further funding 
if necessary (and still run a Facebook page to support them). 
Although the SFL grants were one-off  there was ‘never any 
criterion to be independent in 5 years’; and some projects always 
wanted to stay small, whereas some wanted from the start to be 
part of the mainstream market.
As noted above, apart from technical and emotional support the 
Cultural Brigades programme provided the incalculable support 
of publicity and public relations. ‘Th e whole brigade movement is 
well branded – it’s a sort of quality sign. It gave the benefi ts of one 
to all of us. Just saying you were part of the programme gave you 
an advantage’.
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Realdania and Klimaspring
Th e Philanthropic Association – Realdania 
Realdania grew out of a mortgage credit association. At the 
time of the sale approximately 1.4 bn Euros were designated for 
philanthropic purposes; this forms the foundation’s endowment 
(Realdania is a membership organisation but behaves very much 
like a grant-making and operating foundation). 
Realdania has various purposes. It supports projects in the built 
environment within the following fi ve programmes: room for 
all; the potential of outlying rural areas and the open land; living 
built heritage; cities for people; innovation in construction. 
Realdania aims to create value through development and change, 
dialogue and knowledge, partnerships and networks. In order 
to secure Realdanias’s long-term ability to have signifi cant 
impact, the association’s investment department manages a mix 
of commercial and philanthropic investments. Realdania takes a 
diversifi ed investment approach across various classes of assets to 
ensure stable returns, and manages the assets so that their value is 
preserved in the long run. 
Today Realdania spends between 70 and 140 million Euros a year 
(depending on its investment income) on a mixture of grants to 
existing organisations and projects it generates, supports and, to a 
greater or lesser degree, manages. 
Th e Off spring – Klimaspring
Klimaspring supports companies which focus on developing and 
marketing climate change adaptation solutions to the Danish and 
international markets. Its primary focus is on ways of dealing with 
extreme rainfall in dense cities, helping companies to develop 
solutions that are scalable and sustainable. Klimaspring describes 
itself as operating where water meets the city and the (privatised) 
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water industry meets the construction industry. Th e aim is cross-
sectoral development that not only handles more extreme rainfall 
but also uses water as a valuable resource to create better cities. 
Klimaspring creates consortia and supports them to put forward 
grant proposals to Realdania within the budget of the Klimaspring 
intiative; and as, if not more, importantly, Klimaspring continues to 
advise and support throughout the whole process from embryonic 
idea to market.
Klimaspring is ‘owned’ by Realdania which provides all of 
the money for it. It is implemented by Smith Innovation – an 
innovation company founded in 2009 and partly developed out of 
a Realdania initiative. Klimaspring has a total budget of around 
100m DK (60m from Realdania plus contributions from the 
companies involved). It is accountable to the Realdania Board and 
is governed by a small steering committee made up of people from 
Realdania.
Klimaspring is intended to run for fi ve years from 2013 to 2017, 
and aims to produce around 5 marketable, scalable approaches to 
adaptation to extreme rainfall in cities that also enhance the quality 
of city life. 
Spotting a Gap
In July 2011 Copenhagen experienced extreme rainfall (rainfall 
that might only be expected in 100 years), fl ooding parts of the 
city and surrounding area. Th e cost to the city was estimated at 8 
bn DK. As one person at Realdania commented: ‘Now the climate 
change sceptics could not deny what was happening. It was a 
burning platform – or more accurately a fl ooding platform’. Other 
Danish cities had experienced similar events which in combination 
with long term climate prognoses suggested that the problem 
would recur. 
In the following months various new initiatives sprang up around 
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climate adaptation but many were building site specifi c, some 
were more broadly neighbourhood specifi c, and others were 
research/university driven. From Realdania’s perspective none 
of these initiatives were really touching company mindsets and 
involving companies in creating sustainable solutions. Th e focus 
of Klimaspring was on adapting to extreme rainfall in ways 
that would improve life in cities, as well as developing scalable, 
commercially viable solutions.
Th e idea for Klimaspring was developed by staff  within Realdania 
supported by Smith Innovation and agreed by the Board in August 
2012. ‘Why the idea? Because of the events of July 2011 and 
because, as we saw it, none of the existing projects were engaging 
with companies.’ Once the campaign had been agreed by the Board 
Realdania staff  and Smith Innovation continued to develop the 
details and propose an implementation plan. ‘Why didn’t we do it 
in-house? Largely because we didn’t have the resources in-house 
but also because we mostly work that way. Contracting out is about 
getting the best person for the job, and it’s more fl exible because 
we can scale up or down more easily’. Why was Smith Innovation 
chosen to take Klimaspring forward? ‘Th ey are all about innovation 
and start-ups, they exist to help companies innovate. We knew 
them and they knew us so the transaction costs were as low as they 
could be’. 
Making Plans
When the campaign was taken to Smith Innovation it was ‘Still 
quite open but the desired end result was clear – it was about 
dealing with extreme rainfall and creating extra value in the city. 
How we got there was much more open’.
Th e City government suggested that Realdania might like to join 
with them on an initiative in a single area but Realdania were very 
clear that this was to be about scalable products for the national 
and international market and hence not a project attached to a 
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specifi c part of Copenhagen. However, discussions with the City 
did clarify for Realdania that they wanted this project to be about 
adapting to extreme rainfall and adding to the quality of life in 
cities: ‘it was a brave idea – much harder than just thinking about 
pipes underground’.
Part of the wider gap as Realdania saw it was that none of the 
existing climate adaptation initiatives were designed seriously 
to involve companies. One person commented: ‘Realdania is 
better able to get close to companies than other bodies – some 
organisations talk about it but don’t really understand what is going 
in companies’ heads; for example, government departments have 
such diff erent mind sets and rules’.
Klimaspring was designed to overcome the fundamental problem 
of innovation which involves simultaneous development of 
product, process, sales and organisation. Given that so many 
diff erent skills are involved – and in the case of water in the 
city so many diff erent jurisdictions – innovation involves cross 
-disciplinary cooperation and consortium formation.
Th e plan that was fi nally implemented is based on dialogue 
throughout the process. One fundamental idea is that Klimaspring 
makes it easy to get started but standards get higher and harder to 
meet as the process develops. 
In the start-up design phase Klimaspring brings people with ideas 
together from across skill sets and sectors; it helps to assemble the 
right consortium and facilitates the process that will determine 
the project’s main idea and partners. A company gives its time, 
while Klimaspring is responsible for facilitating the process of 
exchanging and testing and combining ideas to come up with a 
viable ’preject’. Klimaspring may also introduce new participants 
and skills if it considers this necessary.
Th ree workshops cover understanding and ideas, markets, 
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competitors and organisation. If an idea is taking shape 
Klimaspring helps to summarize the results, so that the 
participants and Realdania can decide whether they wish to take 
the ‘preject’ on to the development phase. Th e thinking behind the 
‘preject’ phase is that too oft en grant makers expect applicants to 
have already developed the idea and to have all the answers before 
they have even begun the project. Th e ‘preject’ process allows time 
for throwing ideas around, exploring, adding, subtracting and so 
on. ‘One of problems with many innovation models is that you 
have to know the results in order to apply – so we have the preject 
phase not to fi nd solutions but to fi nd the problem and the right 
partners’. ‘Th e whole process is quicker than waiting for good ideas 
to stumble on our doorstep – and the whole process means that the 
ones that get to be projects have a greater probability of success.’ 
If Realdania accepts the ‘preject’ proposal then, as a part of the 
Klimaspring budget, it off ers fi nancial support for the development 
process directly to the participating companies. Th e criteria for 
fi nancial support are that the proposal relates to adaptation to 
extreme rainfall in cities, is commercially viable, scalable, has 
national and international potential and is likely to achieve market 
maturation by 2017.
For the companies: ‘Th ey spend 4 working days in workshops. And 
then they have a project proposal and then they have to decide if 
they want to invest’. Th ere are no fi xed rules for fi nancing by the 
companies themselves, but those involved must have a commercial 
interest in a successful outcome. ‘Th e move from preject to project 
means a step up in time scale and money. A project requires 6 – 12 
m DK and the company is expected to have to put in half. You do 
make a real investment but it’s a good deal: the product belongs to 
the fi rm, as do the profi ts’. 
In the testing process, advice and funding for testing and approvals 
can be given for completed development projects. Klimaspring can 
also fund additional costs to test the new solution for the fi rst time 
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in a specifi c construction project (all the basic construction costs 
are covered by the fi rms). It will also give advice on marketing and 
scalability. In the fi nal phase Klimaspring gives help to prepare a 
business plan for the exit phase and provides access to potential 
co-investors. 
Th e value of Smith Innovation is seen as being not only in creating 
consortia and helping people hammer out viable projects but also 
in ongoing support. ‘If Smith weren’t there some of the prejects and 
later projects might fold or lose energy – having Smith is part of 
the clever money, the knowledgeable money.’ 
Another advantage of the model is that participants benefi t from 
being part of a network of innovations and knowledge becomes 
collective within Klimaspring and more widely: ‘it’s taking 
knowledge from each project and making it general knowledge, 
getting it out there’.
Challenges
Klimaspring operates with a tight budget and ‘lean’ staffi  ng – 
around 2.5 full time equivalent staff  over 5 years. But the timescale 
itself came from Smith Innovations not Realdania: ‘2017 came 
from us (Smith) – you need a clear budget and you need a sense 
of urgency. I believe in the idea that innovative collaborations are 
dreams with a deadline’.
Finding good ideas is, Klimaspring argues, not diffi  cult. ‘But it’s 
very hard to fi nd companies that will take it all the way. We look as 
much as at the company as the idea. If a company isn’t going to go 
all the way and be the owner then our job is to fi nd the company 
that will and that can be tricky’. One issue is the strong emphasis 
on scalability ‘but the construction industry is not used to that’.
Another challenge relates to selecting companies that will 
contribute to longer term, wider change. ‘Building niche/clusters/
networks of companies, research institutions and government 
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and so on that have knowledge of how to develop these sorts of 
solutions is a very important part of Klimaspring‘s goal. So we look 
at the likelihood of the company being part of that, and whether it 
will contribute to challenging thinking in the fi eld’. 
Interestingly, intellectual property is not seen as a major issue: ‘If 
your idea is so well developed and fi xed in the early stages and you 
do not want to share it with potential partners then it’s not for us’. 
Similarly, there is no suggestion that the foundation is subsidising 
commercial companies; the argument is rather that if Klimaspring 
can show that innovation across disciplines is worth it then that 
will change the mind set of industry. Another argument is that 
there is always a high cost of being fi rst in creating a new market so 
Klimaspring performs a valuable role in reducing some of that cost 
and opening up the market for others.
One major challenge is that the problem of water crosses so many 
boundaries, authorities and responsibilities. One of Klimaspring’s 
roles is to help consortia negotiate the increasingly complex 
governance of water issues. ‘We are trying to make structural 
change and that is hard to do within existing structures or by 
fi rms operating on their own. We try not to be paralysed by the 
complexity of governance – just saying this is what we are going 
to do can be a start’.
Realdania’s clear branding of Klimaspring as a Realdania campaign 
was ‘less a challenge and more a relief as ownership and decisions 
were clear cut – but it could have been diffi  cult if we wanted co-
fi nancing. It could also have been a problem with the companies 
if Realdania wanted to be a part of or branded in the end-products 
but as this is not the case, companies consider that ‘Realdania’ is an 
important tag for their development activities’.
In general Realdania always considers how it can avoid ‘ending 
up with the bill forever’. In the case of Klimaspring that risk has 
been managed by the timetable and the emphasis on marketability 
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of projects. It remains to be seen, of course, whether the projects 
selected will achieve their market goals. 
Klimaspring is an interesting model, somewhat diff erent from 
some of the other cases included here. ‘Could it have happened 
without an external party to fi nance and put together and support 
external parties: no. Could it have happened without Realdania? 
In theory but it’s hard to see who other than Realdania would have 
done it’.
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Stefan Batory Foundation* and 
Institute for Public Aff airs
* Stefan Batory Foundation (SBF) was one of several organisations 
and individuals credited with the birth of the Institute for Public 
Aff airs, but it is widely agreed that without SBF the Institute would 
not have drawn breath.
Th e Parent – Stefan Batory Foundation 
(SBF) 
Stefan Batory Foundation is an independent Polish foundation 
established in 1988 by George Soros and a group of Polish 
democratic opposition leaders of the 1980s. Its mission is to ‘build 
an open, democratic society – a society of people aware of their 
rights and responsibilities, and who are actively involved in the 
life of their local community, country and international society’. 
SBF’s priorities include: improving the quality of Polish democracy; 
strengthening the role of civic institutions in public life; and 
developing international cooperation and solidarity.
SBF describes itself as primarily a grant maker, but it also runs 
some in-house programmes. SBF receives donations from a range 
of sources. Its annual budget is around 15.5 million PLN.
Th e Off -spring: Institute of Public Aff airs
IPA was created in Warsaw in 1995 by SBF, along with other key 
individuals. Its main areas of study include European policy, social 
policy, civil society, migration and development policy as well as 
law and democratic institutions.
Th e IPA has a team of in-house researchers/policy analysts and 
a network of associate experts from academia and other areas. 
It publishes the results of its projects in research reports, policy 
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papers and books, which are broadly disseminated among 
members of parliament, government offi  cials and civil servants, 
academics, journalists and civil society activists. 
IPA works with key international institutions such as the 
European Commission and Parliament as well as OSCE, Council 
of Europe and Community of Democracies and is active in 
many international networks and associations, including 
Policy Association for an Open Society (PASOS) and European 
Partnership for Democracy.
Th e Institute has fi ve major programmes focusing on: Europe, 
Social Policy, Civil Society, Migration and Development Policy, 
and Law and Democratic Institutions.
It has an annual income of 1.5 to 2 million PLN annually; this year 
(2014) it should reach 2.5 million PLN. Starting with around 7 staff , 
IPA now employs 30 staff  working on about 80 projects per year. 
Spotting the Opportunity 
One of the key themes in explanations of the steps leading up to 
creation of the Institute was the notion that all new democracies 
need new political elites. Th e fear was that without policy expertise 
and a place to develop such expertise an emerging democracy ends 
up with ‘policy dilettantes’.
It seems that a number of leading Polish intellectuals, some of 
whom were involved in SBF along with key individuals at the 
Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna* saw this gap individually 
and simultaneously and, by both planning and good fortune, 
started to discuss creating some sort of centre for public policy 
to address the need for policy expertise.
*(set up by Krzysztof Michalski in the 1980s after martial law was declared 
in Poland. Supported by the Pope and by Soros, ‘it was very much a 
creation of the 1980s so it was not a think tank but a place for academics 
to write books etc. There was no place for think tanks in the 1980s’)
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At the time there was little competition to provide policy expertise. 
Other possible centres tended to focus on economic rather than 
wider public policy issues. Th e Universities were busy teaching 
the huge new infl ux of students; in addition, according to some, 
academic circles were slow to change and still taught in ‘old-
fashioned’ ways with old fashioned ideas.
But if there was little competition there was no shortage of 
obstacles to the creation of a new centre for public policy studies.
One obstacle was that there was very little understanding of a 
distinction between policy and politics. In Polish the word for 
‘policy’ and ‘politics’ is the same so if you had ideas on policy 
then you had to be political. As a result there was equally little 
understanding of the work and role of a think tank. (Th e linguistic 
problem is the reason why the Institute is called the Institute for 
Public Aff airs).
Another obstacle was that there was no experience of fundraising 
for organisations independent of the state, and there was no 
tradition within Poland of corporate and big donor giving. ‘Th e 
State did everything and even if people wanted to give to charity 
they would give to children’.
Yet another problem was that George Soros saw the role of the 
SBF as making grants to existing organisations and individuals. 
‘He was very clear. Th e job was to get the money out of the door’. 
Only in the most extreme circumstances would it be appropriate 
for SBF to create a new organisation. Arguably, this was an extreme 
circumstance but, at that time, Soros did not see think tanks as a 
powerful tool for change. (He later changed his mind and accepted 
that ‘those stubborn Poles’ had a point).
Despite these obstacles, and as a fi rst step, in January 1992 SBF 
decided to add to its small collection of operating programmes 
one on Social Policy Reform. Th e focus of this programme was 
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monitoring the eff ects of the economic transformations on social 
life and the impact of social policy on these changes. Th is was 
funded by SBF and the Institute of Human Sciences, Vienna 
(which in turn was funded by the Ford Foundation and Th e Pew 
Charitable Trusts). Th en on January 1 1994 SBF created another 
new programme on Public Administration Reform. Th e focus 
of this programme was ‘support of reform and modernisation of 
structures of the State; undertaking activity oriented at working 
an overall vision of Polish public administration reform and, 
especially, at decentralisation of the State and development of 
local government’. (SBF Annual Report 1995).
Th is was the base from which IPA was born.
Th e Birth of IPA
It seems that organisational births are oft en diffi  cult, complex 
and contested matters. Is the mother, the mid-wife or the 
adoptive father the real saviour of the baby? Add to that the fact 
that although we oft en talk of organisations as created by other 
organisations we tend to forget that organisations are made 
up of individuals who simultaneously are involved in other 
organisations. Th ere were a number of players with somewhat 
overlapping roles from a small group of organisations involved 
in the birth of the IPA as a new being in the world.
Th e two SBF programmes outlined above were running but the 
clamour for a new independent think tank continued to grow. At 
this time one of SBF’s problems was that it was growing very, very 
fast. Between 1991 and 1995 its income increased from 700k PLN 
to over 15 million PLN. ‘We simply could not go any faster’. Th is 
rapid growth was creating managerial and organisational pressures 
and something had to be done to ease the pressure: ‘I wasn’t 
building a Byzantine empire, we wanted modesty’. Th en there was 
another event. 
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In 1994 Solidarity lost the elections and the post-communists came 
to power; the fear was that the reform process would be slowed 
down. One result of these events was that some of the key players 
pressing for creation of an independent think tank re-doubled 
their eff orts and tried to speed up process. Not only was there a 
new urgency to the need for an independent think tank but there 
was also a danger that the policy experience that had been built up 
in the previous administrations would be lost – where would the 
experience of ex-ministers be captured?
Th e chair of SBF, its director and other supporters of creation of 
an independent think tank saw the opportunity to solve several 
problems in one stroke. A new organisation – the IPA – would be 
created and the existing SBF programmes would be transferred to 
it, along with a core grant of 0.5 million PLN. Money also came 
from the Ford Foundation.
IPA began with three key strands – anxiety about the social costs 
of transformation, an interest in constitutionalism (because Poland 
was discussing a new constitution), and a third strand focused on 
CEE co-operation and international relations. Th is third strand 
was added partly because of the input of a Polish ex-diplomat 
who brought ideas, experience and a well developed network of 
foundation contacts from Germany and elsewhere. Th e director of 
this strand was very clear from the start that international relations 
should not be seen as just one among several programmes and 
later this strand was spun off  from IPA to become an independent 
centre. 
As one person closely involved summed up the ‘birth’: ‘It was 
a coming together of ideas, people and money. People at SBF 
and those we were close to saw the gaps of a newly emerging 
democracy. We knew the people who needed policy thinking and 
the people who could give it, and we had both the money and the 
networks to fi nd more money’.
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Th e new Institute suff ered from all of the usual ‘liabilities of 
newness’ as well as the lack of understanding and acceptance of 
the concept of an independent think tank. Its roots within SBF had 
enabled some of the programmes to produce reports and establish 
some preliminary credibility and legitimacy. Th e individuals 
known to be involved in its creation also gave it intellectual and 
political credibility. But, at the same time, association with SBF was 
a mixed blessing: ‘if you were associated with Soros people thought 
you didn’t need money which wasn’t true – but it was true that SBF 
was the largest grant maker in Poland at the time’.
Th ere was never any discussion of naming the Institute aft er SBF 
(or any of the other foundations involved). ‘It needed to cut any ties 
with SBF. Th at wouldn’t have been helpful’. ‘Th e most important 
thing was that it was independent – that was what Poland needed: 
independent organisations’.
‘Later I realised how sensitive perceptions of relationships with 
foreign donors were. Th e Right wing especially attacked with 
the aim of undermining credibility. We always paid attention to 
diversifying the donor base, and now it’s more a matter of self 
esteem’.
Th ose involved in creating IPA were very aware of the need to build 
for sustainability. Th ere was a saying used by one of the founders. 
‘In Polish it’s a play on the word ‘stand’. It means ‘Once you start 
building an institution you have to stand it in such a way that it 
will stand’.
Consolidation and Growth
SBF continued to provide funding to IPA, as did Ford Foundation 
(and some German foundations funding the international 
programme). Th e SBF chair had a seat on the Board of the IPA 
(which it had largely created by gathering key supporters together).
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One of the early issues, perhaps inevitably given the ground-
breaking nature of the concept of the Institute, was fi nding senior 
staff . As one person noted: ‘Th ere was a problem about people: 
there was no tradition of policy studies in Poland; it’s still a 
problem to some extent… Th ere’s a gap between policy needs/skills 
and academics – it’s especially true in Poland. Academics will tell 
you about the problem but they fi nd it hard to say what to do. And 
because policy organisations are quite weak it’s hard to build 
a career so people leave – or don’t choose it’. ‘Th at creates a 
fi nancial vicious circle. When you can’t produce products that are 
not just academic but also have practical value then donors would 
rather spend on children and charity’.
As noted above, the founders of IPA were keen to build on the 
policy experience of ex-ministers. ‘We wanted to involve new 
politicians in the Institute but later that became a source of 
problems because they had their own agendas …’ 
In addition, there were some early misunderstandings about the 
accountability of IPA to SBF in the early days: ‘Th e original staff  
probably thought they had better things to do than write grant 
applications and write reports’ but SBF obviously had to account 
for its spending. As a result the chair of SBF felt he had a confl ict 
of interest and resigned from the Board (though continued to be 
involved and supportive in other roles).
Th e mid to late 1990s were a diffi  cult funding environment for 
new Polish organisations. US and other donors started to reduce 
their funding and encourage organisations to become more 
independent. On the other hand, the law was changed to allow 
people to designate 1% of their personal income tax to registered 
charities tax free and IPA attempted to take advantage of that.
IPA continued to struggle with establishing its value and place 
because each Party continued to want to put in place its own 
programmes with its own staff . Until very recently the Civil Service 
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continued to be vulnerable to political infl uence.
‘Th ere was money from SBF for the fi rst 3 years, then it tapered off . 
Th e fi rst 3 years were very stable and that’s very important because 
you can plan and you can prove yourself with products. Th e fi rst 
foundation is a guarantor in the chain of credibility. It’s all based on 
trust’.
While SBF funds were being tapered, Ford Foundation continued 
to give and later IPA received further funds from a consortium of 
US foundations to build an endowment. Th e ‘endowment’ (600,000 
Euros) grant came with conditions attached and, given current 
interest rates, was hardly more than a ‘reserve and contingency 
fund’. But this grant had an interesting silver lining: it required 
a very visible upgrade in fi nancial accounting and SBF (as the 
administrator) was very thorough. We thought it a nuisance at fi rst 
but it turned out to be good because it has enabled us to manage 
European grants far better’. 
IPA now wins funds from various arms of the EU, but these tend 
to be project specifi c grants. Raising support for an independent 
think tank continues to be challenging. But the IPA believes it has 
achievements to be proud of. For example: ‘I kept saying the costs 
of avoiding catastrophe (in getting the Constitution right) are not 
high. Now, I’m not saying the Constitution is as good as it was 
because of us but I have a suspicion that we helped. Th e Centre 
was perceived as a point of reference’.
‘Th ere was a synergy of diff erent programmes at the beginning 
within the Institute – something unique and aft er 20 years it still 
exists. Th ere was good soil, good water, good seeds and the tree is 
fl ourishing‘.
‘Th e challenges now are to establish its own programmes, not to 
repeat the old; to be creative and to listen. Th e problem is that 
politicians (think they) know better than anyone else. Another 
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problem is transmitting knowledge, skills and so on when the 
project/grant ends. Life is not divided by end of project dates’.
Today (early 2014) the hope is that IPA’s grant application to 
the EEA Funds will be successful (EEA – European Economic 
Agreement bringing together Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein).
Th e verdict: ‘SBF played a very special role here – not just the 
money but also an intellectual role bringing credibility through 
its staff , board and networks. Trust in individuals was important 
because Poland as whole had no track record. What could people 
in New York know about this project in Warsaw – they had to trust 
in the individuals they knew and respected. And people wanted the 
Institute to be seen not as a branch of the SBF. SBF didn’t want to 
play an overwhelming role, and they didn’t. If you look at people 
involved early on they weren’t people you could steer.’
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Stavros Niarchos Foundation and 
Stavros Niarchos Foundation 
Cultural Center
Th e Parent – Stavros Niarchos Foundation 
Th e Stavros Niarchos Foundation (SNF) was created from the 
estate of Stavros Niarchos, the Greek shipping magnate. Th e 
foundation is primarily a grant maker, giving donations in 11 
countries from 3 offi  ces in Athens, Monaco and New York. Fift y 
per cent of grants must be allocated in Greece. Th e foundation will 
be 18 years old this year (2014). Its Board is composed of 3 family 
members and two other people.
SNF works to support projects that exhibit ‘strong leadership and 
sound management’ and to achieve ‘broad, lasting and positive 
impact’. It also ‘seeks actively to support projects that facilitate the 
formation of public-private partnerships as eff ective means for 
serving public welfare’. It describes its approach to grant-making 
as ‘hybrid’ combining strategic long term and short term relief 
oriented initiatives.
SNF does not reveal its assets and income, nor its annual 
expenditure but it has given grants totalling 1.07 billion Euros 
since its creation in 1996. Grants are given in 4 main programmes: 
education, medicine and health, arts and culture and social welfare. 
In January 2012 SNF announced a new programme worth $130 
million designed to combat the consequences of the socioeconomic 
crisis in Greece. In October 2013, the Stavros Niarchos Foundation 
announced a new long-term initiative, Recharging the Youth, to 
help create new opportunities for Greece’s younger generations. 
Th e Foundation is committing €100,000,000 to help the future 
prospects of young people, who are severely impacted by critically 
high unemployment rates, currently exceeding 60%.
9
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Despite SNF’s description of itself as primarily a grant maker in 
the late 1990s it began to explore an idea that ultimately led to 
the creation of a foundation inspired and managed construction 
project – the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center 
(SNFCC). SNF has formally committed 566 million Euros to the 
building of the Center – this is SNF’s biggest single gift  to date.
Th e Off spring – SNFCC
Th e Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center will provide a 
new home for the National Library of Greece NLG) and the Greek 
National Opera (GNO) as well as a 170,000 square metre park. 
Th e buildings have been designed by Renzo Piano and include 
a variety of experimental and eco-friendly techniques. When 
completed SNFCC will be donated to the Greek state for operation 
and up-keep. But the SNFCC is not just buildings and a park, it 
is above all designed to introduce a new concept of the role and 
functions of a library, an opera house and a park as public places 
of entertainment, learning and pleasure. In the current economic 
context it is also seen as a symbol of hope and pride for the Greek 
nation.
Spotting an Opportunity
In the early years of the SNF in the late 1990s board and staff  were 
searching for a project that would make a clear statement about 
the foundation’s values and commitment to the Greek nation. 
Meetings were held with various Ministries to discuss the needs 
of Greek society. One early possibility was providing a new home 
for the NLG which had outgrown its existing accommodation. Th e 
problem was that there was no available site for such a building. 
For several years discussions and the search for a site continued. 
Th e in 2005/6 the government off ered a site to SNF on which they 
might build the new library. At the same time, discussions were 
being held on the possibility of building a new home for the GNO. 
Th erefore, when the State suggested that the SNF develop the new 
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Library project at a former horse racing track site, (an area of over 
170,000 sq.m) the SNF decided to provide the funding to construct 
new buildings for both the NLG and the GNO, as well as a Park to 
surround them. ‘Athens is very short of green spaces and Greece 
doesn’t really do parks. We wanted to introduce a new idea of parks 
as public spaces for learning, exercise, music, playing, doing things 
together as a family, and so on’.
So what started as an idea for a new national library evolved into 
the creation of a cultural center incorporating NLG, GNO and 
a huge park. SNF saw the opportunity not just to create some 
beautiful buildings and a park but to re-defi ne the way in which 
the public related to the library, opera and the environment. Th e 
opportunity was, for example, to expand the focus of NLG from 
an exclusive research facility to an all-inclusive public resource 
with a lending library and a wide range of educational and cultural 
programmes. Similarly, the opportunity was to create a park that 
‘would epitomise the core values of the Center: sustainability, 
access to the arts and education, as well as fun and entertainment’.
It was agreed that the complex would be named the Stavros 
Niarchos Foundation Cultural Center: ‘Th at was very clear to us. 
It’s the only thing we’re asking – an acknowledgement. We’re not 
asking for anything else.’ Another reason for using the name of the 
Foundation ‘is to motivate others, to encourage others to think 
about what they could do for their region’.
Creating a Plan
SNF began detailed discussion with the Greek government to 
establish a public-private partnership to bring the SNFCC to 
fruition. Various ministries were involved – Education for the 
library, Culture responsible for the opera house, the Ministry of 
Finance responsible for the land, and the Ministry of Environment 
for planning permission. Aft er careful thought and study the 
SNF decided to pay for all costs associated with the construction 
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and equipment of the SNFCC up to the point of delivery. Once 
completed the SNFCC would be handed over to the State for 
management and on-going operation. Th e State and the SNF 
signed an agreement outlining the terms of the grant, which was 
then ratifi ed by law.
When the buildings and park are complete there will be 3 
autonomous organisations on the site: NLG, GNO and SNFCC. 
NLG and GNO will be managed and funded as they have been in 
the past (ie by the relevant ministries); SNFCC will be responsible 
for maintaining the whole site, including the park, and for 
organising functions in the park. NLG and GNO will pay service 
fees to SNFCC; and SNFCC will also be supported by the State as 
well as raising other revenue from commercial services on the site 
(cafes, restaurants etc).
From the very beginning SNF was clear that it was starting 
something new that it would not hold onto. Exit was built in from 
the start ‘because we are not an operating foundation and because 
it would be wrong for SNF to interfere in Greek cultural policy’. 
‘Th ere is a limit to our commitment. We build it and deliver it and 
then we’re out of it’.
Th e plan was known to carry some risks. Th e Greek State has a 
poor record in its maintenance and use of, for example, Olympic 
Games facilities, and there were fears that SNF would pay for the 
construction and then fi nd that the State failed to fully honour its 
part of the bargain. 
Th e planning stage also involved an international architectural 
design competition. An international competition was important 
for various reasons including the fact that this was a public project 
and so needed to be seen as open and transparent. Another 
consideration was that SNF wanted an architect with experience 
of such a large project, and preferably one who understood the 
needs of a national library and/or a national opera house. Renzo 
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Piano won the competition.’ Renzo Piano is an Italian so he knew 
how to play with the landscape and the light and he is someone 
who doesn’t want his building to stand out – the plan is burying 
the buildings under the park. Kallithea – the municipality in which 
the site is located – means ‘good view’. Piano wanted to restore the 
‘bella vista’ – the building is under a man made hill so the view to 
the sea is restored’.
Putting the Plan into Operation
Th e plans were developing fast but then the environment changed 
dramatically with the realisation of the scale of the economic crisis 
in Greece. ‘Should we go ahead with spending over half a billion 
Euros on a cultural center? People are going hungry and we’re 
creating an opera … Th ere were hours of discussion in the Board’. 
Finally, it was decided that the project was needed more not less 
in the current circumstances. ‘Greeks used to be known for their 
culture, education, civilisation. We need to restore that. We need 
to feel proud again. We need to create hope’.
Th ere was also an argument that ‘We can take a risk that 
government and business can’t. Th at’s what foundations are for. 
People think we are crazy, organisations are shutting down all 
around – but how do you get out of a crisis if no-one will invest’. 
More tangibly and immediately the project also created business 
and jobs in Greece.
With agreement to continue the project the newly created SNFCC 
board (separate from but appointed by SNF) set about awarding 
the construction contracts. Th e economic crisis had hit building 
fi rms hard and no one Greek fi rm could be found to handle the 
contract. Instead the contract was awarded to a joint venture 
between an Italian and Greek company. Over 140 consultants 
are employed on diff erent aspects of the construction; most of 
those involved are international fi rms but each employs a local 
contractor. Th e total number of employees on the building site is 
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expected to be around 1,500. Another consequence of the crisis has 
been a rise in VAT further increasing the cost of construction.
In addition to the external contractors involved in the project, 
the SNF staff  in Athens share the work-load alongside their other 
duties. ‘No-one will ever understand the love, dedication and time 
devoted to this. It’s like a secret love – from inception to delivery 
and then we’ll leave our baby. We oft en joke about what we will do 
with our time when it’s over’.
In what must have been a bitter-sweet moment for SNF, Renzo 
Piano came to the opening ceremony of the building site on the 
same day that the Greek Parliament was voting the economic 
agreement with the Troika. ‘Th ere were severe disruptions in the 
city centre and on the other side of the city this amazing, hopeful 
dream’. 
Once work began on the site in October 2012 there was a further 
problem – archaeologists discovered skeletons and artefacts from 
an ancient burial ground dating back to around the seventh, eight 
and ninth century BC. ‘Anywhere you dig in Greece you will fi nd 
something but we were lucky because the fi nd is in a place where 
no building was planned so it’s not really holding us up’. Th e fi nds 
will now be placed in a basement exhibition area museum in the 
Visitors’ Centre in the park (another addition to the plan).
Putting the plan into operation required constant thought and 
attention to ensuring a smooth transition and high quality 
operation of the Center aft er the hand over to the State. Monthly 
progress and planning meetings are held with the various 
Ministries involved and further refi nements have been made to 
ensure satisfactory transfer and subsequent operation. Th e project 
has also continuously had the support of the Prime Minister’s 
Offi  ce, despite changes in political leadership throughout the years.
SNFCC appointed its fi rst staff  in 2012. When the Center is 
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delivered to the state all SNFCC staff  will have already been 
appointed by the SNFCC board. Aft er the hand over these staff  
will be transferred and will be responsible for the maintenance 
and operation of the site, all facilities and park events. Part of the 
agreement with the State is that these staff  are kept for at least 5 
years. ‘Th is is important because we have to make sure the staff  are 
there and that they understand the values and the vision – this is 
about much more than simply moving the library and the opera 
to a new site’. For the same reason all of the maintenance contracts 
and operating manuals will be drawn up before transfer to the 
State. 
Other controls are built into the agreement. If the State does not 
maintain and manage the Center satisfactorily then SNF has the 
right to withdraw its name and, in theory, ask for its money back. 
‘It would be a political time bomb if we withdrew our name so that 
is a strong sanction’. SNF also retains power to approve the naming 
of internal spaces, and can audit the use of funds aft er the transfer. 
‘Th ere are a lot of control mechanisms, a lot of protection built in – 
it’s all about ensuring the values and the vision are maintained’.
Challenges
A construction project of this scale presents numerous challenges. 
Th ese challenges have been complicated by SNF’s strong desire 
that everything possible is done to ensure that the project meets 
the highest building and environmental standards. For example, in 
order to avoid removing excavated earth and then having to bring 
in new earth to make the hill, the existing earth has been sift ed on 
site for re-use. Some measures save money, some cost more in the 
short term but will reduce the costs of running the Center in the 
long term. 
All agree that ‘the building will happen, it will be fantastic, it 
will be a landmark’ but the real challenge is ‘what happens next’. 
One anxiety in what happens next is the State’s capacity and will 
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to continue to support and develop SNFCC, especially in such 
diffi  cult economic times. Related to that is the challenge of ‘creating 
a mass audience – not just intellectuals’. A mass audience is not 
only part of the vision but is also seen as essential in building 
political will to continue supporting the Center.
Th e challenge of creating an audience is partly one of 
communication. Th is has its own challenges. SNF has traditionally 
maintained a low profi le; SNFCC needs to have a very high profi le 
‘so there is a bit of a tension there. It’s not our usual style’. Another 
problem is, of course, that at present SNFCC is a huge building site 
with very little – except 11 tower cranes – to see. Th e newly created 
Visitors’ Center (not part of the original plan) shows people what 
SNFCC will look like and, through interactive models, illustrates 
what it will provide.
Winning a mass audience is particularly challenging because 
the concept of a publicly accessible national library and opera is 
new to Athens, as is the notion of a park as a place for learning 
and fun. GNO has a new creative director who has been ‘taking 
opera to the people’ and NLG will also have a new director. Staff  
of both organisations need training in adjusting to the vision of 
SNFCC and ways of drawing in new audiences. SNF is paying for 
this training as an important part of ensuring the success of the 
project. Th is is in addition to the construction budget which now 
stands at 566 million Euros. ‘As with all grants the key is to have a 
sustainability plan and to create all of the circumstances that make 
the project viable in the long term’. If staff  need training to deliver 
the vision then from SNF’s viewpoint that is an essential part of 
‘construction’. 
Th e site some way out of Athens and without a metro close by adds 
to the challenge of building a mass audience. Shuttle buses will 
run from the nearest metro and SNF is also working with others to 
create demand for construction of a closer metro in the future.
Another more subtle challenge is how to combine user demands 
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and preferences with maintenance of the vision of SNFCC. For 
example, people have asked whether pets will be allowed in the 
park. Th e problem is that Athenians do not have a culture of 
cleaning up aft er their pets so ‘the alternative is to have signs 
everywhere which is not how we envisaged the ethos of the park. 
We don’t want to be directive but …’
Th ere are challenges related to the budget. Construction costs have 
risen (partly due to a rise in VAT as a result of the economic crisis) 
and additional costs have been added such as training courses, 
other removal/transfer costs and the creation of the Visitors’ 
Centre and the museum to house the archaeological fi nds. Some 
costs cannot be known until the last minute – for example, fi nal 
decisions about the technology for public use in the library will be 
made as late as possible in order to ensure that all equipment is ‘the 
latest and the best’. Th ere is another complication regarding costs 
especially for NLG. If NLG is successful in attracting a high volume 
of users its costs will rise because all services are free, but the gap 
between the anticipated running costs and the actual costs cannot 
be known in advance (in theory this is a problem for the State and 
not for SNF). 
SNF is well aware of the dilemmas: ‘If you want this to be 
successful then you have to provide the resources – but you don’t 
want them to see SNF as an ATM’. Th e hope is that SNFCC will 
be properly supported by the State and that it will be able to 
generate some of its own income from service provision and from 
fundraising (in which staff  are receiving training). ‘In ten years 
time the expectation is that SNFCC will support itself but, of 
course, SNF might still provide support for special projects’.
Over and over again those involved in SNFCC repeated that 
they have total confi dence in delivering a beautiful landmark but 
whether the wider vision will be fulfi lled is, at this stage, unknown. 
Whatever the result, SNF has worked to anticipate possible 
diffi  culties and has spent time and money in order to avoid them. 
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‘If you don’t think out of the box 
philanthropy just plays the role 
of rescue team’.
‘Th ere are too many tourists 
in philanthropy’.
‘I don’t know how else a foundation 
can do disruptive change’.
Entrepreneurial Foundations
In the last 10-20 years foundations acting as venture 
philanthropists have received considerable attention. While the 
venture philanthropist works primarily with existing organisations, 
the inventive foundation is involved in the conception and creation 
of something new which the foundation usually also backs 
fi nancially and supports in other ways. 
Every one of the cases discussed above illustrates the role of 
foundations in seeing a gap or a need and bringing together the 
people, ideas and resources necessary to craft  a solution or a 
response. In all of the cases outlined here the foundation’s role is 
about much more than money. In some cases the foundation is 
acting as a bridge between institutions or sectors (as in the case 
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of SNF and OSFL); in other cases, the foundation acts as a 
convenor of individuals (as in the case of SBF), and in other 
cases the foundation bridges both individuals and sectors.
Entrepreneurial foundations may create ‘social enterprises/
business’ or, more broadly, they may create new institutions 
or adapt existing ones. 
A Variety of Foundations, Contexts and 
Cases
Th ere is no suggestion that this small study is in any way 
representative of the variety of foundations’ entrepreneurial 
behaviour. However, cases were deliberately selected to include 
larger and smaller foundations and enterprises, as well as a variety 
of politically, socially and economically diff erent contexts. In 
some countries there is a well-developed and established non-
profi t sector and an acceptance of the legitimacy of philanthropic 
foundations. In other countries, the non-profi t sector is less 
developed, and foundations may be looked upon with some 
suspicion. At the time of writing (late 2013/early 2014) public 
services in all of the countries visited, with perhaps one exception, 
were under fi nancial pressure – but the degree of pressure on 
people and services was very diff erent.
Th e cases not only came from diff erent contexts but also covered 
a range of substantive fi elds from local and national arts and 
culture enterprises to ones concerned with the environment and 
with reconciliation. 
Enterprises also operated in very diff erent markets; for example, 
EcoMozaik has to be able to sell short shelf life, weather dependent 
goods while the SNFCC has to, among other things, fi nd ways 
of ensuring the maintenance of physical plant and of building 
audiences. Diff erent market and challenges have a variety of 
implications including diff erent issues around building for 
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sustainability, time scales and criteria of success.
Th e cases considered also have diff erent operating styles/goals. 
Some are about social enterprise in the conventional sense. For 
example, EcoMozaik, Klimaspring and some of the Cultural 
Brigades are ‘social businesses’ in the sense that they aim to 
compete in the market and be self-supporting. Some cases are 
not only or primarily about creating a social business. It is one of 
the arguably more dangerous modern myths to believe that every 
organisation can support itself in the market and, for example, 
Phineo and Headstrong recognise that their services can never be 
fully supported by the market. 
What the cases have in common is that the foundation is creating 
something new, or adapting existing arrangements or structures – 
the foundation is acting an institutional entrepreneur.
Foundations are, in theory, well positioned to be institutional 
entrepreneurs. Foundations have knowledge, broad networks and 
resources. Th ey are not so ‘embedded’ that they cannot imagine 
new ideas, but they are suffi  ciently embedded to acquire the 
resources and open the doors to put new ideas into practice. 
But there are also challenges for the foundation wanting to act 
as an institutional entrepreneur.
Challenges and Considerations
Cultural Reluctance
Th e fi rst challenge is the cultural reluctance of foundations to 
create something new. Th e dilemma is nicely illustrated in the 
following two quotations which highlight foundations’ (arguably 
false) choice between being limited in eff ect or running the risk of 
appearing arrogant and interfering.
‘A foundation is one way to approach philanthropy, but think for 
instance of ‘venture philanthropy’ or ‘social enterprises’ – making 
money by doing good. Having an open mind about philanthropy 
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can help us be more focused’. ‘Change is not an option it is a must’ 
(Enric Banda, Th e Current state of European philanthropy, Eff ect, 
autumn 2013).
But the danger is: ‘when philanthropic actors think they know 
better than others – when external agendas and solutions about 
issues that they have little understanding or experience of are 
imposed on populations to whom they have not listened … such 
arrogance in the development sector goes well beyond the bounds 
of philanthropy …’  (Th eo Sowa, Eff ect, autumn 2013). 
Of course, foundations acting as social entrepreneurs work hard to 
ensure that they are not arrogant and that they do understand the 
issues – but there will always be the fear that in treading on existing 
actors’ toes they will be accused of ‘interfering’.
Th e Big Why
Almost every foundation interviewee stressed that ‘Th e biggest 
question has to be: why are you creating a new organisation’.
One answer was that there is a need: ‘If there’s a need for something 
to happen why not set up a new organisation? If you need a new 
organisation to make it happen then do it’.
Th ere was a more explicit suggestion that: ‘If you are a foundation 
and you have purpose xyz then you have to ask what is the best 
way to maximise the outcomes this foundation is set up to do’. 
‘Foundations can be important agents, always looking for the best 
way and one way may be to set up new organisations’. If no existing 
organisation is fi lling the gap and no organisation is equipped 
to do so, then, and only then, did foundations consider creating 
something new.
But creating a new organisation was not something foundations 
embarked on without careful thought: ‘ Th e biggest lesson is think 
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strategically about how you can have infl uence on what you want 
to do. How do you multiply and magnify rather than doing it all 
yourself ’.
Interestingly the thought process was challenging. On refl ection 
some foundations believed that they tended to be overly infl uenced 
by what was on off er from grantees or what others were interested 
in. ‘It has taught us to really think what’s needed and not just do 
what others are doing’. Creating something new was not necessarily 
the end choice, but just considering what was needed – versus the 
conventional ‘off er’ – could be instructive.
Another important element in ‘the big why?’ was the source 
of the foundation’s mandate to create something new – or as 
some organisations might see it: ‘to interfere in the market’. Do 
foundations have the right to create new entities which they then 
expect others to support? 
It seems that for many of the foundations included in this study 
the ‘creation mandate’ comes from the combination of existence 
of a need (and lack of an existing organisation) coupled with 
the foundation’s own mandate to pursue the public good.
Th e foundation has a mandate because there is a need and the 
foundation has a duty to address unmet need. 
For some, a signifi cant reason for not creating something new was 
the fear of ‘ending up with the bill forever’. As one person suggested 
‘It is rare that you can say mission accomplished – and letting go 
by giving it away is dangerous. If you give expensive gift s without 
running costs then you risk undermining your own eff ectiveness.’ 
It seems that this is not just a case of ‘caveat emptor’ but also donor 
beware.
In some cases there was another consideration that had less to do 
with starting a new organisation and more to do with the focus and 
feasibility of the initiative. For example, in some cases there were 
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questions about focussing on the arts or the environment at a time 
of economic crisis. New initiatives may generate internal tensions – 
as well as new energy.
More Th inking and Preparation
How and by whom the decision to proceed with a new creation is 
sometimes diffi  cult to reconstruct. People move on, organisations 
forget and there is not one but many moving spirits thinking along 
similar lines. But it was clear that part of the thinking process 
was usually a very thorough research process/market analysis to 
identify other players including other non-profi t organisations, 
other foundations and local and national government: ‘You need to 
be clear you’re not duplicating’. Interestingly, however, one person 
noted ‘but that ought to be part of good grant-making anyway’. 
Obviously, the content, scope and scale of this phase will depend in 
part upon the nature of the enterprise and in part on the political, 
economic and non-profi t environment. But even in cases of clear 
cut need, lack of competition, agreed statutory support and so on, 
it is important to remember that environments can change with 
frightening rapidity – and that all needs are relative.
In some larger projects there were also detailed feasibility studies 
to explore long term sustainability and to develop a business plan. 
Who is involved in the feasibility studies and how new ideas are 
communicated may be an important fi rst step in establishing need 
and legitimacy, demonstrating cultural awareness and avoiding the 
charge of ‘external interference’.
At this stage sustainability and foundation exit were likely to be 
issues high on the agenda. But one person noted that ‘you don’t 
have to assume that success is something going on for ever – 
sometimes success is ceasing to exist because things have changed’.
Finally: ‘You have to be very, very realistic about what you can – 
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and can’t – do.’ And, of course, in all cases the foundation’s board 
had to be persuaded that this was a feasible and appropriate role 
for the foundation (in one case, with or without the donor’s full 
support).
Again it is interesting to refl ect on what was less oft en mentioned. 
One rarely discussed topic was the opportunity cost of creating 
something new. Of course, there is an opportunity cost to every 
grant but given that creation of a new organisation was widely seen 
as requiring a higher emotional and intellectual investment than a 
grant, the opportunity cost was likely to be proportionately higher.
Individuals and ‘the’ Foundation
Th e cases above have been presented in terms of the foundation 
– the initial ideas and decisions come from ‘the foundation’. In 
reality, of course, a range of individuals are involved, with some 
undoubtedly pressing harder than others. Without question 
entrepreneurial individuals, on the staff  and board, played 
important roles in the new creation. But, as noted above, it is oft en 
diffi  cult in retrospect to identify exactly who was involved let alone 
who played the ‘most important’ role. It would be fascinating to 
understand the interplay of the individual entrepreneur and the 
foundation as an organisation; this is particularly interesting given 
what some might see as an in-built conservatism in the very nature 
of a foundation. Th e problem is that to understand the interaction 
between individual and foundation in enterprise creation it would 
be necessary to include some ideas that were suggested but never 
implemented.
A Programme or a New Organisation? 
Th e line between a foundation programme (in-house) and a new 
organisation may be a thin one – both institutionally and over 
time. What starts as a programme may become a new organisation 
– whatever the original intention (ie some new organisations start 
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as a programme with the intention of spinning off ; some start as a 
programme and then grow to a point where a decision is made to 
spin them off ). In the cases presented here the main focus has been 
on initiatives that were always intended to be (come) independent.
Reasons for creating an independent organisation rather than 
a new in-house programme fell into 4 related categories:
1.  Longevity – the hope was that the new organisation would 
attract other funders 
2.  Independence, legitimacy and reputation – the organisation 
would have its own independent and separate reputation/
legitimacy 
3.  Compared with starting a new in-house programme, 
creating an independent organisation could avoid longer 
term commitment from the foundation; avoid approvals for 
new posts; avoid the appearance of additional operational 
(programme) costs
4.  Political considerations – the foundation is not seen to be 
imposing its agenda (but this may or may not be successful)
Again some argued that many of these considerations applied to all 
grant-making.
A fi ft h type of reason which was rarely mentioned was that 
creating a new organisation enabled the foundation to create 
new knowledge and to keep control over it. One of the potential 
disadvantages of making grants is that the grantee develops and 
keeps any new knowledge. Th e control over knowledge from 
foundation-generated organisations might be used simply to add to 
the foundation’s total stock of knowledge and/or it might be used 
to create ‘general knowledge, getting it out there’. At a time when 
in some countries there are strong reasons for grantees involved in 
the market to keep intellectual property to themselves, the role of 
foundations in sharing knowledge becomes more important.
Another consideration worth mentioning is the choice between 
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creating something new and trying to ‘rescue’ or ‘re-form’ an 
existing organisation/initiative. One of the cases we intended 
to include in this collection involved an attempt to ‘re-form’ an 
existing organisation; with the benefi t of hindsight, in this case 
it would probably have been easier and more eff ective to start 
anew. Arguably, the beauty of starting with a clean sheet is that 
you can design to purpose rather than having to make the best of 
old structures etc. (But, arguably, starting something new involves 
taking responsibility for failure in a way that ‘rescue’ does not).
Overcoming the Liabilities of Newness
Th e ‘liabilities of newness’ refers to the problem suff ered by all new 
organisations to one degree or another – new organisations have 
no track record, no reputation, few resources and yet, with little 
evidence, they have to persuade supporters, funders, users etc to 
trust them. Foundations – and other true innovators – face another 
problem: that of re-framing issues, working between or outside of 
existing concepts and practices.
Internally trustees have to be prepared to back something 
unknown, untried, non-existent – ‘they’re being asked to support 
a dream’. Externally, the new venture suff ers from the same 
problem. How can it fi nd other backers and customers, establish 
itself in a fi eld, enter a market, when it has no reputation, no 
networks, nothing to show? In every case, association with the 
foundation was seen as crucial in gaining access to people with 
the capacity to help. As one person said ‘Without the name of the 
foundation we wouldn’t have got through the door, and even if we 
had we wouldn’t have got to the people with the authority to make 
decisions’.
Th e diffi  culties of gaining legitimacy and traction in existing markets 
– whether you are selling lettuces or policy expertise – especially 
when you are challenging the status quo should not be under-
estimated. Th e market may exist but entering it is another matter.
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Incubating
One way of overcoming the liabilities of newness was to create and 
test a model or to produce some preliminary results within some 
other organisation that already had legitimacy/ support/resources. 
For example, the Phineo model was developed and tested within 
the Bertelsmann Foundation; LSx was incubated within Forum 
for the Future with money and support from City Bridge Trust. 
Th e potential downside of this approach is that the organisation 
may have diffi  culties leaving the nest and/or establishing its own 
reputation and legitimacy independent of its ‘foster-mother’.
Hosting
Hosting is somewhat diff erent from incubating in that the host and 
hosted may be autonomous organisations but the host provides 
certain services (such as premises and perhaps pay roll and 
fi nancial services etc) to the (new) hosted organisation. Th ere may 
be advantages for both host and hosted in this arrangement but 
the downside may be that the young organisation is able to ‘ignore’ 
certain tedious realities of everyday life.
Naming
Another approach to helping an organisation gain legitimacy and 
reputation is to give it the name of the foundation. In the majority 
of these cases this option was deliberately avoided primarily 
on the grounds that athough this might have some immediate 
benefi ts it would make it more diffi  cult for the organisation to 
raise funds from others in the long run. Th e counter-argument 
was that naming was an important guarantor of the future of the 
organisation (ie the Foundation could withdraw its name if it 
were not satisfi ed) – but this probably only applies in particular 
circumstances. 
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Th e ‘Family’ Analogy
Th oughts about the foundation’s role as ‘creator’ and the challenges 
of getting the new organisation through its early months, as well 
as issues of ‘incubation’, ‘hosting’ and ‘naming’, were frequently 
expressed in analogies with parenting. Instead of seeing themselves 
as ‘midwives’ – a more traditional foundation presentation of role 
– respondents seemed to use the parenting analogy to (openly 
or tacitly) acknowledge the work, the long term commitment, 
the emotional involvement, the power and the responsibility of 
parenting. 
If the foundation as grant maker to existing organisations is the 
kindly aunt/godmother who calls by with gift s now and again, the 
foundation as institutional entrepreneur is parent, with all that 
implies for good and ill. Parent is a very diff erent role from that 
of god-mother, but it is worth remembering that transition to 
adulthood requires a cast of characters including teachers, friends, 
health carers, and so on. Th e need for a wider support network was 
emphasised in the need for partners.
Involving Partners 
A number of respondents stressed the importance of involving 
partners in the new organisation as early as possible. In some cases 
the idea for the new organisation may come from a collaboration, 
but if not early involvement was seen as encouraging wider 
‘ownership’ of the organisation and reducing the danger of it being 
seen as ‘X foundation’s baby’. But involving partners also had costs: 
‘we always choose to be a minority partner. As a foundation we 
want fl exibility so we can’t fund something forever. I see some 
examples – the name is oft en an indicator – where it’s clear the 
foundation wants the organisation tied to it forever. But being 
a minority partner means that when you want something to 
happen you have to do a lot of opinion building.’ ‘A minority role 
has many benefi ts but it means you can’t impose. If you have a very 
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very clear idea of what you want then it doesn’t work. You have to 
be prepared for trial and error, and experimenting and learning.’
Respondents also emphasised the importance of understanding 
‘the logics and laws’ of partners which may be very diff erent from 
the foundation’s own. Th e choice of partners may also be important 
in sending public messages about the nature and future of the 
organisation. For example, in one case partners were deliberately 
selected to include all sectors in order to emphasise the bridge 
building aspirations of the new organisation.
Budgeting and Finance
Flexibility and Adaptability
One of the recurrent themes in this study was the need for budget 
fl exibility. Circumstances change and unanticipated costs arise – 
whether these are the result of a global fi nancial crisis or of fi nding 
5th century skeletons on the building site. As one foundation said 
‘Making it work and getting your off spring to walk and run may 
take more money than you think – will you leave that to fate?’. 
‘If it’s truly innovative you can’t always know price in advance‘.
Th e need for fl exibility and adaptability especially in relation 
to budgets highlights one of the key diff erences between the 
foundation as grant maker and as institutional entrepreneur. In 
grant-making the grantee typically lives with the consequences – 
and costs – of unforeseen circumstances; when the foundation acts 
as an institutional entrepreneur the foundation more obviously 
and directly bears the consequences. (of course, some might argue 
that the foundations should always share the burden of unforeseen 
costs).
As discussed below, fl exibility and adaptability did not just apply 
to budgets. ‘One lesson for foundations is that you have got to 
be adaptable and change with the environment. You have to 
be absolutely clear about what you want to achieve and put in 
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whatever it takes to make that happen’. Another said: ‘Th is is 
uncertainty – big time. You need time, patience and fl exibility 
every step of the way – maybe you will see results in 20 years?’. 
Governance and Management
Th e Right People
It was generally agreed that fi nding the right staff  and board 
members was crucial to the likely success of the new venture. 
Choice of one director or one chair person over another could set 
the strategic direction of the new organisation; and recruitment 
decisions could bring out underlying diff erences in perspective 
between stakeholders regarding the nature and purpose of the 
organisation.
In a number of cases it had proved more diffi  cult than anticipated 
to fi nd the right senior staff  to run the new organisation. In 
some cases this was partly because the organisation was doing 
something truly new of which few people already had experience. 
For example, one common complaint in social enterprises was 
that ‘people get the enterprise bit but not the social bit – or vice 
versa’. Similarly, it was sometimes diffi  cult to recruit someone 
with substantive expertise (in the key purpose) and experience of 
running a new and/or fundraising organisation.
New organisations were generally seen to require people with ‘drive 
and fl air’ rather than simply competence and experience. ‘In the 
private sector a start-up would operate with a slug of money or a 
lunatic who works all hours. Th e slug of money model is probably 
better but you do need someone with entrepreneurial drive too’. 
In some cases the new organisation managed to combine very 
diff erent skills between staff  and foundation.
A Seat on the Board
Whether to take a seat on the Board of the new organisation was 
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generally a dilemma. In a minority of cases the foundation chose 
not to sometimes because ‘it was our baby and it was a diff erent 
emotional relationship – I would not have wanted to look failure 
in the eye’. When the foundation did have a seat on the Board of 
the new organisation this could create diffi  culties. For example, 
in one case the foundation’s presence on the Board created tension 
because the foundation representative ‘never knew which hat he/
she was wearing, and there was a feeling that there could never be 
a completely honest conversation’. In another case the tension 
arose because the new organisation was accountable to the 
foundation for continuing grants but the chair of the two boards 
was the same person.
Whatever decision was made about the foundation’s presence on 
the Board the wider message was summed up by one interviewee: 
‘If you want control, if you want this thing to be in your own image 
then do it yourself.’ Interestingly, one of the dangers of creating a 
new organisations is that the off spring can later compete with the 
parent and vice versa.
Building Infrastructure
Th e importance of building sound infrastructure for the new 
organisation was emphasised again and again – even when it had 
not been achieved. Getting the governance right was essential. But 
so too was ‘spending money on operational support – getting the 
right offi  ce, to develop corporate identity, to team build, to develop 
a new strong corporate culture’.
In at least two cases the foundation had been given or had accepted 
a site at a preferential rate. Neither of the sites were ideal and 
created new problems in ensuring the success of the initiative.
One of the issues for foundations in investing in infrastructure 
is that the result is long term. For example, ‘You have to invest 
in the expertise of staff  – but there is a time delay in the pay off ’. 
Foundation boards who attempt to reduce their anxiety at funding 
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the non-existent unknown by asking for performance measures 
aft er one year may risk killing the baby before it can walk.
Clearly, new organisations need time to begin to show results for 
which ongoing funding and some degree of security is essential. 
But ‘there’s a trade off  between the confi dence of solid funding 
and maintaining the feeling of a start-up – being innovative and 
keeping that’.
One way in which some foundations attempted to support 
infrastructure building was to perform certain back-offi  ce services 
for the new organisation until it was fully established. For the 
foundation this also had the advantage of economies of scale. 
However, depending on the visibility of the service it could mean 
that the new organisation remained identifi ed with its founder.
Communications
New organisations generally need to develop a strong 
communications strategy and capacity. Th is is something the 
foundation may be tempted to provide itself. Communications 
can be an area of diffi  culty between foundation and off -spring. Th e 
foundation may be used to a low-key approach to communications 
and may feel less comfortable with the higher profi le required by 
the new organisation. One danger of a low foundation profi le is 
that the foundation is accused of lack of transparency. On the other 
hand, the foundation may be very happy with the progress of its 
‘baby’ and want to communicate this – but this may be unwelcome 
insofar as it brands the new organisation as ‘x’s baby’ undermining 
its perceived independence.
Ongoing Support
On-going support was another aspect of fl exibility and adaptability.
‘You must have people in the organisation who can go in to help if 
things get rough. Staff  leave and you have to be ready to jump in 
if necessary. In some cases its because partners change or partners 
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change strategy – you need to be there to help work through 
solutions’. ‘It is a long term commitment. Like children they never 
really leave you’.
Exit
Th ere was a strong view that exit comes at the beginning of the 
initiative. Having an exit plan should be part of the discussions 
about embarking on the venture in the fi rst place. In one case 
the foundation’s exit was very carefully managed and conditions 
were built into agreements and contracts. But as stressed above, 
adaptability and fl exibility in the light of changing circumstances 
and needs were also crucial. So it may be more realistic to suggest 
that exit must be planned and built from the beginning (eg 
involving partners early on, developing communications and 
marketing strategies etc) but that the precise timing and nature 
of exit may have to be negotiable. It is also worth noting that ‘exit’ 
did not, in practice, generally mean cutting off  all support; some 
foundations ceased core funding but then remained involved by 
funding specifi c projects. 
One person noted that exit was likely to involve dilemmas for both 
parties: ‘When it’s time for independence is it the parents who can’t 
let go, or do they let go too soon? Or is it the child who can’t let go? 
And then there’s the runaway child …’
Last Words
Acting as an institutional entrepreneur is not for the hasty or 
the faint-hearted. But as one person said: ‘the benefi ts are that 
you don’t lose long term impact and you’re not constrained to 
being only as good as the existing non-profi t sector. Without this 
model we lose a major tool for innovation. As in business we need 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs’. It is also worth noting that 
several interviewees remarked that being involved in creating a 
new organisation had given them extra skills for grant-making (eg 
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being more careful about budgets and time scales, looking more 
closely at competence etc).
Th e frequency with which people talked about starting new 
initiatives in terms of parenting was striking. So perhaps the 
last word should go to the person who said: ‘Setting up a new 
organisation has to be very well thought about. It’s like children 
– they are there all the time. Th ere are diff erent ages and stages 
and diff erent tensions but they never really go away. If you had an 
idea of what’s involved you’d never do it – but then you’d never get 
the rewards either. I love this model – like parenthood it’s full of 
wonderful surprises’.
And it is worth remembering that off  spring can be ungrateful and 
forget the role of their parents in their existence and achievements – 





creating new ventures in Europe
This short report explores the neglected topic of foundations’ 
involvement in the creation of new organisations. In recent years 
much attention has been paid to venture philanthropy but there 
has been little focus on foundations as entrepreneurs creating 
new organisations and institutions. 
Based on interviews across Europe, the exploratory study tells 
nine stories of entrepreneurial, or inventive, foundations and 
their creations. It explores why foundations take the big and 
bold step of inventing something new, the processes, 
considerations and challenges along the way.
The nine cases are very different in socio-political context, 
in purposes, and in scale. Despite these differences there are 
a number of common issues which all inventive foundations 
need to consider including how to let go while at the same time 
ensuring the future of their fledgling creation. The report does 
not tell foundations how to be inventive but rather highlights 
some of the issues they may wish to consider.
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